19 MARCH 2012
Speaking at a recent Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) summit, Saudi King Abdullah proposed a confederation of the primary states in the Arabian Peninsula.
Although Saudi Arabia, Oman and the various smaller Emirates have always maintained close institutional ties, such a declaration is unprecedented, and represents a pushback against both an emerging Iranian hegemon in the region and the fallout of the Arab Spring throughout the Middle East.
What form such an initiative would take and whether it is even practical remains debated, but the statement itself is worthy of considerable note, reflecting the collective fears of security analysts and policy makers in the Gulf.
The nature and goals of Iran’s current nuclear program remain unclear and contested across many circles. Some, like Georgetown University’s Matthew Kroenig, argue that a nuclear WMD in Iran is imminent, presents a dire threat to global security and must be stopped by any means necessary, including military action. Those in this camp justify such a position with reference to the fiery rhetoric of the Iranian leadership, its clandestine support for militant Islamist groups like Hezbollah and its revolutionary foreign policy. Striking Iranian nuclear capabilities, they argue, will deter the Persian state from future attempts at nuclear development and ensure a WMD-free Persian Gulf with manageable collateral fallout from the use of targeted violence.
Others, like Harvard’s Stephen M. Walt challenge the ‘war as only option’ thesis, citing Iran’s previous proclivity towards rational action, its historical lack of a militarily aggressive foreign policy, and a lack of empirical data surrounding Iranian nuclear capabilities and goals. Walt argues that many of the charges levelled against Iran to prove its hostility are simply part of modern statecraft, and the same tactics are utilised by numerous other rational nation states to further their own interests abroad.
Regardless of this debate, it appears that the Gulf Arabs are very much in the hawkish camp and are convinced that Iran is making an active bid for a nuclear WMD capability. This view was illustrated in a leaked 2010 State Department document that discussed high-level Saudi pressures on the Obama administration to launch military strikes on Iranian nuclear infrastructure.
A nuclear Tehran would change the dynamic of the Gulf security dilemma. Such a capability would tip the scales of the current conventional balance between the GCC states and Iran, rendering much of the Arab conventional military technological superiority obsolete. Nuclear weaponisation would also grant Iran a credible deterrent to US intervention, potentially reformatting the US security assurances to the Peninsula states by forcing it to seriously reassess the cost/benefit ratio of granting such protection. Increased unification between the Monarchies is the obvious path to provide a counterbalance to the expanding Persian influence in the Gulf. A united Arab power bloc will allow for better coordination between economic, diplomatic and military efforts against Tehran, enabling the GCC more cohesion in its search for security and peace of mind in the region.
At the same time that it is dealing with the state-based threat of Iran, the GCC is also increasingly concerned over the aftershocks of the Arab spring. Despite the autocratic nature of their rule, the Gulf Monarchies have been able to weather the deluge of civil unrest through a combination of robust rent economies, religious legitimisation (primarily in the Saudi case) , as well as organised and effective security apparatuses capable of snuffing out defiance where it emerges.
The high level of GDP per capita in most of the Peninsula states means that the socioeconomic drivers behind much of the unrest across the Middle East are simply not present inside the GCC, at least in the majority Sunni populations. Still, even with their relative economic advantage, the Arab monarchies suffer from the matter of unelected illegitimacy, an issue exacerbated by an almost pathological tendency by the state to sabotage any efforts towards federal-level democratic reform inside their borders.
At the same time old friends seem to be challenging the status quo of rule in the Gulf. The Egyptian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, usually a close ally of the house of Saud, are now questioning the authority of the Saudi monarchy, suggesting that the house of Saud’s claim that political Islam is only viable under a monarchical system of governance is a false one. In such an ideologically volatile environment, a move to find common ground and close ranks in the GCC seems to be the logical direction.
GCC action against the Arab spring materialised most spectacularly in march of last year when a Gulf Shield Force, spearheaded by the elite Saudi Arabian National Guard (an interesting development in and of itself since, at the time, the media reported that Saudi Army units had been used, and the Guard is legally an internal security force not to be used internationally), broke a long standing policy of non-intervention and entered Bahrain to crush the Shia uprising, ensuring the continued rule of the Sunni Khalifa Monarchy. Riyadh, in particular, was worried that if such a revolution were to succeed, it might spread and foment in the eastern Arabian provinces where the Shi’ite populations are concentrated, igniting wider regional unrest.
Although the Sunni populations of the Peninsula remain placated, viewing their conservative regimes as the most viable source of economic progress, the GCC is concerned over a restive and repressed Shi’ite minority inspired by the Arab Spring and supported ideologically (at the very least) by an antagonistic Iran. The Bahrain crisis demonstrated that some of the smaller Emirates lack a security establishment loyal or capable enough to deal with domestic issues that have emerged as a result of underlying socioeconomic disparities.
The result was that to maintain its sovereign authority the Khalifa regime had to rely on external intervention. Confederation will help to facilitate an internationally acceptable legal framework for intervention if future turmoil erupts inside the GCC, by largely internalising such a matter. This, in turn, will allow for quicker and more effective use of force by member states in suppressing dissent.
In the past year both Jordan and Morocco have made bids to become members of the GCC – seen by many as a move that will potentially strengthen the organisation. The admission of these non-peninsula states to the Council could boost its influence in the Middle East, but the prospect also carries a number of philosophical and pragmatic problems. Both Jordan and Morocco are constitutional monarchies with operating parliaments and varying levels of democratic engagement available to their polity. This is in direct opposition to the dominant Gulf state’s absolutist forms of royal governance, a position, they maintain, that is the only form of rule appropriate to the region.
The entrance of the Amman and Rabat into the GCC formula could create a serious dilemma for the Emirate states, further empowering potential critics in pointing out the disparity between the differing forms of rule of the new and old inside the Council. Jordan’s own domestic position is also still precarious, and it remains to be seen whether its monarch, Abdullah II, can manage the aftershocks of the Arab spring in the Levant and the ever-present challenge to his own rule. If Jordan were to be admitted to the GCC, then have its political order promptly collapse, the Gulf Arabs would have consigned themselves to clean up an immense mess, even with a more capable security force.
The notion of a confederation in the Arabian Peninsula highlights the uncertainty and fears playing in the minds of the Gulf regimes at the moment. With a resurgent Iran and the emergence of revolutionary democratic movements around their periphery, the Arab monarchies are seeking to reassert their position and ensure stability.
Whether or not such unity can be achieved remains to be seen: it is inevitable in such a system that the Saudis would take the major leadership role, much to the chagrin of the historically competitive House Al Thani in Qatar.
Regardless of the viability of such a union, however, the fact that it is being seriously considered shows the underlying cracks in the veneer of calmness currently being projected by the GCC.
Ben Rich is working on a PhD at the Global Terrorism Research Centre, Monash University. He blogs at The Arabian Apologist. View his full profile here.
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