FORBES
Supporters of the Moroccan Justice and Development party (PJD) (Image credit: AFP/Getty Images via @daylife)
The rising Islamist tide may recede sooner than expected in the Arab world — if recent events in Morocco are any guide.
Six months after a surprising win in that North African country’s first elections under its new constitution, the Islamist Party of Justice and Development (known as PJD) is in trouble with voters. Urban and rising middle-class Moroccans—the core of the PJD’s support—are questioning whether the ruling party can create jobs. These voters supported the more secular Socialist and Liberal parties in the 2007 elections, switched to the Islamists in 2011, and now seem to be returning home. Meanwhile, the PJD’s cultural policies have emboldened rival parties, business leaders and activists. Now they are fighting back and the Islamists are falling in public opinion polls.
Most Middle East analysts make two fundamental errors: They have a static perspective that simply extends the present into the future in a straight line, and they tend to focus on Egypt, where one-quarter of the Arab League lives, while ignoring the North African and Gulf states where important changes are underway.
Analysts overlook that Libya has not followed the Islamist lead charted by Egypt. Indeed, Egypt might be a unique case. The Muslim Brotherhood has been a strong force since the end of colonial rule in the 1940s and it now dominates 12 of the 24 major professional unions, and has a strong hand in another six unions. This institutional force allows it to moblize voters and win elections. The Brotherhood’s powerful and well-oiled political machine in Egypt lacks counterparts in many other Arab nations.
Elections can sweep Islamists to power, but they can also sweep them out when they fail to perform. This is precisely what happened in Iraq, when Mocter al-Sadr’s radical party failed to deliver on its promises when it controlled the Health and Education ministries. The party continued in the ruling coalition but its ministers were removed from governing in these vital areas, lest the coalition suffer a defeat in the next election cycle.
Now we are seeing both phenomena in Morocco. Arab Spring came there in February 2011, with massive but largely peaceful demonstrations. In a July 2011 referendum, a new Moroccan constitution established a constitutional monarchy, akin to that of Sweden or Great Britain. That constitution provided for an elected prime minister to lead the government and all ministries, while the king maintained his status as the country’s highest religious authority and commander of the armed forces. Following the November 2011 elections, a new PJD-led government took power in January, ruling in a coalition based on a 27% parliamentary plurality. Both the king and the new Islamist government were tested by a skeptical public that watched to see whether the king would actually share power (he did) and whether the Islamists would govern as centrists as they promised (they haven’t yet).
Today the king of Morocco is more popular than ever. And the Islamists much less so. Even fringe Islamist elements, left out of the government, who have challenged the monarchy for decades have now altered their rhetoric. They have stopped campaigning against the king’s role as the nation’s religious authority and taken instead to criticizing the ruling Islamist PJD for its handling of domestic social issues.
While the system has gained credibility for empowering voters and been a quiet triumph for Arab democracy that the Obama Administration has ignored, the ruling PJD appears to have lost some credibility due to their poor performance on the economy.
Part of the reason may be the understandably high expectations of voters: unlike in Tunisia and Egypt, where Islamist movements were banned from the political process, in Morocco the monarchy has actively encouraged their participation over the past two decades. Moroccans felt that the PJD’s experience in political opposition would allow it to hit the ground running when governing as a majority bloc. This optimistic view has faded. Even defenders of the Islamist government now admit that the PJD still hasn’t made the transition from a platitude-driven opposition party to a ruling party capable of making economic reforms.
Amid a global economic crisis and grave security concerns arising from Libya and other nations ringing the Sahara, elements of the PJD have focused on minor social issues that animate only their hard-core supporters, such as whether to allow the sale or consumption of alcohol, or which Moroccans should be described as “Zionists.” At times, moreover, PJD activism on these fronts appears to have taken precedence over the fostering of democratic freedoms, economic development, and anti-corruption measures—the items that won them the election just seven months ago.
Democratic freedoms were not advanced when some PJD members of parliament called for the censoring of 2M, the popular Moroccan television network, for broadcasting a documentary about Moroccan Jews emigrating to Israel. (The bigger and more worrying question—why does one of the Arab World’s oldest Jewish populations feel it must flee ?) Islamist officials claimed that the network was “Zionist” for airing the program. Liberals responded that airing a historical documentary about Moroccan Jews was a legitimate choice and in keeping with Morocco’s tradition of tolerance toward Jews. Indeed, King Muhammad V, the present king’s grandfather, memorably protected the Jewish population from the pro-Nazi Vichy government during World War II, and both his son and grandson have worked hard to support peace initiatives between Israelis and Palestinians. The PJD attack on the network backfired. The press and the public rallied to the network’s side. Suddenly the PJD was on the defensive.
Nor has economic reality been a constraint on PJD’s excesses. Last month, several PJD members of parliament publicly mulled banning alcohol at public events, restricting the sale of alcohol in restaurants, and ending advertising for alcoholic beverages. In an oil-poor country where tourism is the second-largest foreign exchange earner (after phosphate exports) that generates some 20% of GDP, passage of any anti-alcohol measure could cause a net loss of more than 300,000 jobs. Conservative Muslims in Morocco, including many who voted for the PJD, understand this too. Both the constitution, which enshrines Islamic tradition as a pillar of the state constitution, and the government bureaucracy have long sought to balance the country’s conservative mores with the more libertine culture of visitors; calibrating these two considerations is a complex and subtle job. The PJD threatened to wreck this rough equilibrium and hurt the economy in the bargain. The Morrocan public didn’t like that.
Meanwhile, the PJD-led government has not yet advanced a coherent strategy to fight corruption in Morocco. Much of the talk about corruption has been accusations of corrupt behavior leveled against particular political figures, who are coincidentally political rivals of the PJD. In a few cases, these accusations were retracted by the PJD after they proved unable to substantiate them.
Of course, corruption is a serious problem plaguing Morocco’s public and private sector. Bribery is widespread. The country needs a government to initiate systemic reforms that can credibly challenge the corrupt status quo. Not only have the PJD’s baseless accusations been self-defeating, they have also undermined the credibility that the government needs in order to fight corruption as the voters demand. Before the Islamist government, some agencies were created to fight bribery and promote fair competitive practices — but they were not granted the legal mandate needed. That was supposed to be left to a new elected government. Many Moroccans hoped that the PJD would give these institutions the “teeth” they require, but so far nothing has happened. The Islamists seem uninterested in what was the biggest applause line of Arab Spring demonstrations this past year. Now their inaction is costing them precious political support.
All these actions have provoked reactions, which may be good for Moroccan democracy, though not for the PJD. Take the private sector response to last month’s proposed anti-alcohol legislation. Morocco’s National Tourism Federation, National Federation of Restaurant Owners, National Federation of Travel Agents, and a handful of other groups suddenly found themselves united by a common adversary and acted accordingly. They formed a Western-style political lobbying group. They entered into a public debate with the PJD, arguing that the legislation, in their words, “contradicts {the PJD’s] own declared goal of protecting public interests” and would only help the black market by pushing alcohol sales underground. This lobby also proposed constructive policies to mitigate real public concerns, such as funding awareness-raising programs and plans aimed at tackling alcoholism-related healthcare issues. These actions mark a new civic activism. Similar initiatives are underway among feminists, filmmakers, musicians, human rights activists, and others who feel threatened by the PJD’s social agenda.
Among political parties, as well, factionalism is out of vogue and coalition building is in. For decades, Morocco’s liberal, socialist, and secular parties have been splintered — divided by personal differences in a low-stakes parliamentary game that only alienated voters. Today, a confluence of political streams are flowing together to form a pact to challenge the PJD with a no-confidence vote in parliament. Old-fashioned horse-trading is underway to lure the PJD’s coalition partners out of its ruling bloc, collapsing its hold on power. Islamists are particularly vulnerable to such an attempt: with a 27% plurality, they rely heavily on their pact with the leftist “Party of Progress and Socialism,” centrist “Popular Movement,” and nationalist conservative “Istiqlal” parties to maintain control. If one or more of these parties leave the government, the Islamist government will collapse and new elections be called.
To be sure, the PJD is only six months into its first term as a governing coalition. Some voters likely believe it needs more time to fulfill its mandate.
Yet the patience of the public is wearing thin. Every day, the Islmaists have new opportunities to advance strategically shrewd policies to redress the country’s social and economic problems. So far, the party has passed up these opportunities and squandered time on 7th century priorities.
But the people have not passed up these opportunities. Fighting the Islamists seems to have galvanized large sections of Moroccan society and invigorated that nation’s nascent democracy. The Islamists—in Morocco and across the Arab world—may be finding out that the Arab apetitite for reform and economic growth is large, but the demand for theocratic restrictions much less so. Arabs want their own Switzerland, not their own Iran.
Arab Spring surprised Western diplomats and journalists by sweeping the Islamists to power. It may surprise them again by sweeping them out.
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