Alpher opines on what the Assad regime prevailing in Syria would mean for the Middle East, what Israel and the American Jewish community can do to influence whether or not the Alawite regime in Syria survives, and how Islamist electoral victories thus far (in Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco and Kuwait) have already affected civil rights and freedoms.
Q. Last week you opined that if you had to place a bet, you would gamble on the Assad regime prevailing in Syria. Suppose it does: what does this mean for the Middle East?
A. First, definitions. By “prevailing”, I mean successfully suppressing the current armed revolution and ending mass demonstrations against the regime. And by the “Assad regime” I mean Alawite-dominated rule over Syria–even if at some point Bashar Assad himself is sacrificed by his fellow Alawites as they seek to maintain their grip on power.
This is not an exercise in idle speculation, in the sense that, as matters stand, the regime remains broadly united, it enjoys the loyalty of most of the army, and the opposition appears to be hopelessly splintered and unorganized. On the other hand, this is indeed a speculative endeavor because it is engaged in a revolutionary (and therefore, by definition, unpredictable) situation.
I would suggest we look at a broad spectrum of possibilities that is suggested by two fundamental post-victory realities. First, post-revolution Alawite-ruled Syria will be able to rely only on Iran for support, and to a lesser extent on Shiite elements in Iraq and Lebanon and on Russia and China. The rest of the world, and especially the Sunni Arab world and the West, will continue to condemn Syria and deny it aid. Hence the regime will be more isolated than ever if and when it triumphs. And second, while Syria would emerge from the revolution with an Alawite victory, it would be impoverished and battered economically, nationally and in terms of societal cohesion.
Here, based on these assumptions, are three speculative scenarios. At one end of the spectrum, the victorious but bloodied Alawite regime is pressured by Iran and/or Russia to normalize and permit limited liberal reforms to alleviate domestic pressures while it seeks to repair relations regionally and internationally, for example by offering to discuss peace with Israel, renewing cooperation projects with Turkey, and offering Jordan economic benefits. Under this scenario, Syria seeks to avoid at all costs any sort of confrontation with its neighbors, including Israel, at least until the regime puts the country back on its feet.
At the other end of the spectrum, the regime emerges from its revolutionary experience so thoroughly paranoid that its sole preoccupation is to prevent a recurrence of revolt and to rebuff hostility along its borders. Hence it invokes fierce repression at home, and regionally seeks only to strengthen its links with Iran, the Shiite government in Baghdad and Hezbollah in Lebanon: the “Shiite crescent”.
Either way, the experience of suppressing a Sunni-dominated revolution will have strengthened the Alawites’ ties with Iran and its proxies and allies. Accordingly, one key factor in assessing the regime’s post-conflict behavior could be the parallel fate of Iran’s fortunes. If, for example, Iran emerges stronger from its growing confrontation with Israel and the West over the nuclear issue, we can anticipate a militant Iran-Syria axis seeking to challenge Israel and perhaps the Sunni Arab world as well, thereby severely aggravating regional tensions.
If, on the other hand, the Alawites are obliged to recognize that they can no longer fully rely on the backing of a weakened Iran, they might display greater readiness to appease, both domestically and regionally.
In fact, as is usually the case, reality will probably fall somewhere in between these two extremes, or even embody seemingly contradictory elements of both. One likely variation might be initial adoption of scenario one–conciliation and appeasement–but an eventual turn to scenario two–paranoid hostility and oppression–once it becomes clear that conciliation has failed and most of the world still vehemently condemns the regime. Any Israeli government, for example, would presumably rebuff the surviving Alawite regime no matter what peace conditions it offered, if only to avoid being stigmatized internationally and regionally for having “rehabilitated” it.
There is a third scenario, encouraged by the Syrian reality revealed so glaringly by the revolution: more than most Arab states, Syria comprises large non-Sunni and non-Arab ethnic minorities–Alawites, Christians, Druze, Kurds, etc.–many of which still to one degree or another support the regime out of fear of the majority Sunnis. Because I’m a student of Israel’s historic links with non-Arab, non-Muslim or non-Sunni minorities in the region, I’ll permit myself to suggest an extremely “creative” scenario based on this reality.
This might be somehow imaginable if indeed a post-conflict Alawite regime in Syria is unable or unwilling to rely any longer on Iran with its intractable hostility toward Israel, yet remains thoroughly at odds with the Sunni Arab world and its own large Sunni population: the regime would actively seek a confederation of Levant minorities that ostensibly share the Alawites’ fears.
This would embody an attempt by the Alawites to solidify and amplify their traditional alliances with Syria’s Christians, Druze, and other small minorities, restore and improve relations with the country’s Kurds (who are currently increasingly allied with the revolutionary opposition), reach out to Christians, Druze and Shiites in neighboring Lebanon, and seek some sort of modus vivendi with the region’s Jews–meaning Israel.
Admittedly, this is a very unlikely scenario, not the least because Syria’s ruling Baath party has always been a champion of Arab nationalism. But then again, all three scenarios are speculative. At best, they can help us think about what may lie somewhere beyond a regime victory in Syria, if indeed that is the outcome.
Q. Still, the survival of the Alawite regime in Syria is increasingly unpleasant to contemplate. What can Israel and the American Jewish community do about it?
A. The Netanyahu government is maintaining an impressive silence regarding the fate of all the revolutions surrounding Israel. Opinion polling shows that, at least regarding Syria, a large majority of the Israeli public concurs that silence and non-interference, even verbal, is a prudent approach. Israelis, obviously, would like to see the downfall of a regime that provides Iran with a solid strategic base in the Levant. But they also fear being surrounded by Sunni Islamist–presumably Muslim Brotherhood–regimes on all fronts, including Syria. Nor does the performance of the fragmented Syrian opposition thus far inspire confidence that it will triumph. So why needlessly antagonize Bashar Assad, who at least enjoys the distinction of knowing how to maintain a quiet border?
Some hawkish Israelis also fear massive international pressure on Israel to exchange the Golan Heights for peace with a moderate, secular Syrian successor regime if the opposition triumphs. Finally, the last thing the Syrian opposition wants to hear is a ringing Israeli endorsement of its cause, which could embarrass it and compromise its Arab national credentials.
Still, Israel does have an interest in sending positive signals to the opposition in Syria in order to ensure a stable shared border, shared hostility toward Iran and Hezbollah, and perhaps even peaceful relations if and when it triumphs. Sunday’s declaration by Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman that Israel would provide humanitarian aid to Syrians was an important step.
Here too, conceivably, the American Jewish community could prove influential, for example by lobbying Congress to support the opposition and even advocate arming it. This could also prove to be a useful vehicle for weakening Iran’s overall strategic posture, particularly on Israel’s borders, without necessarily supporting American or Israeli military action directly against Iran.
Q. Apropos the fear of Islamist political dominance of the post-revolutionary Arab world, do you have a sense of the degree to which Islamist electoral victories thus far (in Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco and Kuwait) have already affected civil rights and freedoms?
A. I recently had the opportunity to listen in on a conversation among mostly young women from these countries and elsewhere in the Arab world on precisely this topic. Their status report is gloomy. Increasingly, the only women who remain in Arab politics and public life are those who accept the Islamist agenda, including regarding dress codes. In Kuwait, four women who pioneered the vote for women and then got themselves elected to parliament a few years ago have now been forced out by an Islamist electoral victory. In Iraq, the moment the US withdrawal was completed, retrograde restrictions on women’s freedom were enacted (the Saddam Hussein regime, for all its evils, was highly secular and promoted women’s rights in many spheres). In Egypt, Muslim Brotherhood “militias” have here and there replaced the army in “discouraging” women’s demonstrations and the like.
Even in non-Arab Turkey, after around a decade of rule by a moderate Islamist party, the percentage of women in the work force has declined by one-third. There are also indications that Islamists have begun to rewrite textbooks to reflect their ideology–a key harbinger of things to come.
Paradoxically, the only Arab woman activist who reported progress in implementing women’s rights was from Saudi Arabia, where there was no revolution and there are few political rights for men or women. But progress in Saudi terms, unfortunately, means little more than advances in obtaining the right to drive and in enabling women, for the first time, to sell lingerie to other women.
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