FROM THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT
The announcement on June 24th that Mohammed Morsi had won the second round of Egypt’s presidential election and would become the country’s first freely elected civilian head of state was greeted with jubilation by the hundreds of thousands of people who had thronged central Cairo in anticipation of the result. Many challenges lie ahead, however. The president’s role has been limited by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), and the drafting of a new constitution is likely to prove another major hurdle.
The mood in Tahrir Square had been very different in the days immediately after the election when protesters gathered to voice their anger at the actions of the SCAF. The ruling military council had dissolved parliament two days before the second round of the election, which took place on June 16th and 17th, and had issued a constitutional declaration appropriating legislative powers to itself and reducing the powers of the new president. A delay in announcing the election result had provoked suspicion that the SCAF was contriving to engineer a victory for its preferred candidate, Ahmed Shafiq, despite early tallies showing that Mr Morsi had clearly won. Denying the presidency to Mr Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood candidate, would have risked sparking off violent confrontations, however. The SCAF has settled instead for a strategy of judicial and constitutional restrictions on the new president. This means that further political struggles lie ahead over the drafting of the constitution and the preparations for a new parliamentary election, as well over the operation of Mr Morsi’s government, over which the SCAF, in its guise as interim legislature, will hold considerable power.
Delayed result
The Supreme Presidential Electoral Commission (SPEC), a panel of judges tasked with supervising the election, took one week to sort through the results and consider legal challenges. Early indications had shown that Mr Morsi was ahead, and on June 19th his Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) said that he had won with 52% of the vote, against 48% for Mr Shafiq, based on tabulated returns from all of the polling stations. Mr Shafiq’s camp persisted in claiming that their candidate had won, but did not provide details. The SCAF warned both sides to desist from making unfounded predictions, and thereby inflaming public sentiment. When the SPEC finally issued the result it was closely in line with the FJP’s earlier figure, with Mr Morsi getting 51.73% and Mr Shafiq 48.26%. The turnout was 51.8% of the 50m eligible voters.
The confusion about the election result and about the SCAF’s real intentions created a deep sense of foreboding among Egypt’s revolutionary activists. Their concerns were shared by the financial community, as shown by the near 10% fall in the EGX 30 stockmarket index (which has since rebounded strongly on the back of Mr Morsi’s election). The positive mood created by the announcement of the result could be short-lived, however, as many fundamental questions about how post-revolution Egypt is to be governed remain to be resolved.
Brief respite?
One of the first problems will be how Mr Morsi is to be sworn in. The interim constitution states that this should be done by parliament, but with the legislature dissolved and the People’s Assembly building cordoned off by troops, this is unlikely to happen. That means that Mr Morsi could be obliged to assume power under the blessing of the SCAF in its guise as a temporary legislature, which would suggest strongly that he remains beholden to the military establishment. The SCAF’s claim that it was bound to dissolve parliament after the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) invalidated one-third of the seats won in the general election is not universally accepted, and there is also some dispute about whether the SCAF has the automatic right to take over the functions of parliament, including responsibility for the budget for the 2012/13 fiscal year, which starts on July 1st.
Legal consolidation
During the week-long delay in publishing the presidential election result, the SCAF moved to consolidate its legal position by confirming the appointment of a new head of the SCC, Maher el-Beheiry. The system for senior judicial appointments was changed after the revolution, giving the SCC’s General Assembly of Judges responsibility on the basis of seniority. The pool of senior judges is filled with Mubarak-era appointees, which means that the new president’s power to influence the judiciary will be limited. This will be reassuring to those concerned about the risk that Mr Morsi will impose an overtly Islamic judicial agenda, but it is also likely to maintain a conservative bias in judicial and constitutional issues.
Powers divided
The SCAF’s constitutional declaration on June 17th conferred on Mr Morsi the right to appoint the members of a new government, but the military council has retained critical powers over security and over the drafting of the new constitution. Mr Morsi has indicated that he aims to form a broad-based government, and he has been casting around for a non-partisan figure to become prime minister. Among his key challenges will be to reassure Egypt’s 8m Copts, many of whom will have voted for Mr Shafiq. Mr Morsi’s first administration is likely to be dominated by technocrats, and it is doubtful whether he will risk antagonising the SCAF by trying to impose his will on security matters. Mr Morsi has said that his foreign policy priority will be a strategic relationship with the US, but the election of an Islamist president will nevertheless present a new challenge for the West. Israel has said that it “respects” the outcome of the democratic process in Egypt, but it will undoubtedly be watching developments across the border more closely. The FJP has stressed its ongoing commitment to existing international treaties, but it could be pushed into a more adversarial stance if Israel were to resume attacks on Gaza, for example.
There is likely to be continuity in Egypt’s economic policy, as the FJP has not dissented radically from the agenda of the gradual reduction of subsidies and the promotion of private investment adopted by both pre- and post-Mubarak governments. However, it is unclear whether the new government will be inclined or able to conclude a loan agreement with the IMF, given the continued uncertainty over the constitution and the election of a new parliament. The IMF has stated that it requires any such loan agreement to have the broad support of all political stakeholders in Egypt.
The constituent assembly formed by the dissolved parliament remains in place, but the SCAF has assumed the right to intervene if the head of the military council considers that any article in its draft conflicts with “the goals of the revolution” or with elements in previous constitutions. If the assembly objects, the dispute will be referred to the SCC, whose judgment will be final. The SCAF has also stated that it may appoint a new assembly if the current one faces insurmountable obstacles to completing its work. The constitution looks like being the next major battleground in Egypt’s long-running struggle for power, which has now been complicated by greater uncertainty over the role that the SCAF intends to play in the future.
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