MIDDLE EAST | DECEMBER 2011
ARAB MONARCHIES
Chance for Reform, Yet Unmet
Marina Ottaway and Marwan Muasher
© 2011 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. All rights reserved.
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CP 132
Summary 1
Introduction 3
Morocco: Keeping Ahead of Protest? 3
The Constitution 4
Beyond the Constitution 6
Jordan: A Reluctant Drift Toward Reform 8
Widespread Frustration 9
Political Reform Efforts Since January 2011 10
Economic Reform Efforts Since January 2011 12
Looking Forward 13
The Gulf States: Still Waiting for Reform 14
Bahrain: Between the Arab Spring and Iran 14
Saudi Arabia: Buying Domestic Peace 16
Qatar: Supporting Change—But Not at Home 18
Oman: Calls for Reform Rather Than Regime Overthrow 18
The United Arab Emirates: Absence of Protests
and Preventive Development Measures 19
Kuwait: A Dysfunctional Parliamentary
System Faces the Arab Spring 19
Contents
Conclusion 21
Notes 23
About the Authors 27
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 28
1
Summary
Contrary to what ongoing protests across the Middle East and North Africa
might imply, monarchs and ruling families in the Arab world still enjoy an
extraordinary degree of legitimacy in the eyes of their people. Most citizens
of Arab monarchies want to see changes within their ruling governments,
not complete regime change. This in turn affords those rulers an opportunity
to embark on a path of far-reaching political reform without losing their
thrones—all the while gaining acclaim at home and abroad.
Yet, so far, no monarch has made the effort. Sovereigns are not seeking to
truly take advantage of their legitimacy to engineer a process of controlled
reform from the top that would prevent an escalation of demands from the
bottom. These rulers have not accepted that the change sweeping the region is
profound, and that the unique opportunity they still have to lead their countries
into a decisive program of reform will not last forever.
All monarchs have taken steps to appease their citizens, but they have either
provided material benefits to try to placate demands or introduced narrow
reforms that give their people a limited voice in governance. Political measures
have ranged from ostensibly bold but in reality limited in Morocco, to hesitant
and uncertain in Jordan, to practically nonexistent in the Gulf countries. With
a few partial exceptions, Arab monarchs are not moving their countries toward
the representative governments that protesters are demanding.
With the possible exception of Bahrain, the one place where protesters are
calling for a true constitutional monarchy, there is still time for Arab sovereigns
to change course. It is less dangerous for the monarchs to act now than to
wait until the demand is overwhelming and could indeed spiral into an uncontrolled
process of change. Their legitimacy is at stake, and they will likely face
more severe challenges if they do not act soon.
3
Introduction
The idea that Arab monarchies would introduce political reforms more easily
than republican regimes has long enjoyed a degree of popularity. Monarchies,
the argument goes, have a built-in advantage that allows them to reform more
easily than republics: a king can renounce much, even all, of his political
power, and still remain king, with all the wealth and prestige the position
entails. A president, by contrast, becomes a normal citizen as soon as he steps
down from office.
The response of the eight Arab monarchies to the upheaval that has shaken
the region in 2011 shows that it is true that monarchs and ruling families in the
Arab world still enjoy an extraordinary degree of legitimacy in the eyes of their
citizens. In return, this affords them an opportunity to embark on a path of farreaching
political reform without losing their thrones—
and conversely gaining acclaim at home and abroad. But
it also shows that with a few partial exceptions, Arab sovereigns
have not been inclined to take advantage of their
legitimacy to move their countries toward the democratic
governments that Arab protesters are demanding.
While all monarchs have taken steps to appease their
citizens, they have tended to do so either by providing
them with material benefits or by introducing narrow
reforms that give them a limited voice in the governance of their countries.
Political measures have ranged from ostensibly bold but in reality limited in
Morocco, to hesitant and uncertain in Jordan, to practically nonexistent in the
Gulf countries. Monarchs are not seeking to take advantage of their legitimacy
to engineer a process of controlled reform from the top that would prevent an
escalation of demands from the bottom. As a result, their legitimacy may be
eroded and they are likely to face more severe challenges in the future.
Morocco: Keeping Ahead of Protest?
Alone among Arab monarchs, King Mohammed VI of Morocco quickly
embraced a significant political reform agenda as soon as protests broke out
on February 20, 2011, seeking to defuse demands for change by positioning
himself at the forefront of reform. Within two weeks of the start of street
protests, he announced that a new constitution would be drafted and submitted
to a popular referendum, with early parliamentary elections following
Arab sovereigns have not been
inclined to take advantage of their
legitimacy to move their countries
toward the democratic governments
that Arab protesters are demanding.
4 | Arab Monarchies: Chance for Reform, Yet Unmet
soon afterward. Mohammed’s approach followed the well-established pattern
of preempting bottom-up demands by offering limited top-down reforms, a
model that has characterized the style of the Moroccan monarchy since the
final years of Hassan II’s reign in the late 1990s. Whether the king’s offer
will satisfy the public’s demands in the politically charged atmosphere of the
regional Arab Spring remains to be seen.
The Constitution
On March 9, just two weeks after the start of protests, the king announced
the drafting of a new constitution, despite the fact that the country’s protests
had been limited compared to those of Tunisia and Egypt. Because he moved
quickly and ahead of the protesters, he enjoyed complete flexibility in deciding
who would write the document and thus how far it would go in fashioning a
new political system. At a time when Egypt and Tunisia were shaken by acrimonious
controversy over whether their constitutions should be written by an
elected constitutional assembly or by an appointed committee before the staging
of elections, Morocco’s king answered the question himself before it was
asked: the constitution would be prepared by a commission of experts named
by the king and headed by one of his advisers, Abdellatif Menouni. In order to
make the process slightly more democratic, the king also ordered the formation
of a curiously named mécanisme de suivi, or supporting mechanism. Headed
by Mohammed Moatassim, this body was supposed to serve as liaison between
the drafters of the constitution on one side and political parties, labor unions,
associations of businessmen, human rights organizations, and other groups on
the other. Indeed, the experts’ commission received many submissions, some
of them entire constitutional drafts and others only suggestions on key points.
Participation, however, stopped with these submissions. No follow-up debate
was organized and the “mechanism” was not consulted again until its members
were summoned on June 8 to hear an oral presentation on the new constitution.
They did not see the written draft until June 16, only one day ahead of
the general public.
The two most controversial issues in the drafting of the constitution concerned
the identity of the Moroccan state and the power and role of the king.
The document provided a fairly clear answer to the former question, namely
that Morocco is, at least formally, a plural society in terms of religion, language,
and culture, and that it is ready to embrace this diversity. The preamble
defines Morocco as a Muslim state and Article 3 states that Islam is the state
religion—this was inevitable because the Moroccan king is considered to be
the “commander of the faithful” and thus religion provides the underpinning
for his legitimacy and power. Nevertheless, the constitution also guarantees
freedom of religious practices to all faiths. Compared to the text of most Arab
constitutions, which proclaim sharia as one of the sources, if not the source, of
law, the new Moroccan constitution (like the previous one) is quite liberal. It
Marina Ottaway and Marwan Muasher | 5
It is safe to assume that reform in all areas
will be tightly controlled by the sovereign.
is important to point out, however, that a recommendation that the constitution
should guarantee “freedom of conscience” was rejected. Allowing people
to change faiths, it was argued, would release a Pandora’s Box of individual
choices more dangerous and unpredictable than organized religion.
The new constitution also recognizes Amazigh (or Berber) as an official language,
despite objections that such recognition would dilute Morocco’s Arab
identity. In addition, it contains a reference to the plurality of influences on
Moroccan culture, from Andalusian and, more broadly, Mediterranean culture
to that of the Saharan people, as well as of Christianity and Judaism.
The message concerning the power of the king is more ambiguous, however.
This is, of course, the central issue in Morocco as it will determine whether the
palace can maintain control of the process of change, shape reform as it sees fit,
and avoid the uprisings that have shaken other countries in North Africa. The
constitution does not transform Morocco into a constitutional monarchy (or a
parliamentary monarchy, in the language favored by Moroccans) where the king
does not govern—that was not the intention. But the constitution does impose
new formal limits on the king’s power, stipulating that he must nominate the
“president of the government,” as the prime minister is now known, from the
party that has received the largest number of votes in the elections. On the
other hand, the constitution reserves three crucial areas—religion, security, and
strategic policy choices—as the king’s exclusive domain. When such issues are
discussed, the king will preside over the cabinet, which automatically ensures
that he will have the last word—and probably the first—in any decision.
Between the two extremes there is a vast gray area where the parliament
and the cabinet could have broad power if they decide to exercise it but where
the king could intervene by declaring a decision strategic. For example, the
king does not normally have control over matters of education;
decisions in this domain will be made by the cabinet,
presided over by the prime minister. Should the king
decide that a certain educational issue—say, curriculum
revisions—is strategic, however, he can intervene and take
the matter back into his own hands. The king has thus far
insisted on putting his name on all new policies—as was done in 2001 when he
announced the formation of a royal commission to draft a new personal status
code (the laws that govern marriage and divorce, among other issues) rather
than accepting the recommendations already set forth by women’s organizations
and other civil society groups. Further reducing the likelihood that parliament
and the cabinet will attempt to expand their domain is a long history
of passivity and deference to the king. Analysts argue that even under the old
constitution, the parliament and the cabinet could have exercised considerably
more influence on policies than they did. It is thus safe to assume that reform
in all areas will be tightly controlled by the sovereign.
6 | Arab Monarchies: Chance for Reform, Yet Unmet
The constitutional draft was submitted to a popular referendum on July 1
and, as expected, easily won approval. Official sources reported that 98.5 percent
of voters approved the new document, and that voter turnout was 73 percent.
The overwhelming referendum victory may have weakened, rather than
strengthened, the chances that the constitution will be fully implemented. The
absence of discussion about the new constitution suggests that the vote was a
declaration of confidence in the king and his leadership more than a declaration
of support for a set of rules by which the king is expected to abide.
Beyond the Constitution
There is a real possibility that the new constitution’s passage will not be followed
by real political reform, however. This, in turn, could spell trouble for the
future. Because of the ambiguity of the text where the power of the sovereign
is concerned, the king can still maintain control over most decisions unless he
is challenged by political parties in the parliament or the extraparliamentary
opposition. However, many of the old parties are palace parties that have no
intention to challenge Mohammed. The opposition parties of the Hassan II
era, particularly the conservative Istiqlal Party and the once-socialist-oriented
USFP (Socialist Union of Popular Forces), have lost much
of their dynamism. Their aging leadership does not appear
interested in upsetting the status quo.
Nor is the new Party for Authenticity and Modernity
(PAM) a force that will try to transform the parliament
into a countervailing power to the monarch. Launched by
former minister of interior Fouad Ali Helmi, a personal
friend of the king, shortly before the 2009 municipal elections, the party won
the largest number of local council seats. Even more remarkably, it established
a strong presence in the parliament without competing in parliamentary elections,
due to party mergers, alliances, and other parties’ members changing
their affiliations. In preparation for the 2011 elections, the PAM, widely seen
as the king’s party, formed a “Coalition for Democracy” with three older palace
parties (the National Rally of Independents, the Constitutional Union, and the
Popular Movement) and four small and disparate parties (the Socialist Party,
the Labor Party, the Green Left Party, and the Islamist Party of Renaissance
and Virtue). The G-8, as the members of the alliance became known, failed to
win the plurality of votes; thus it will remain in the opposition. In that role, it
will certainly challenge the government, but not the king.
Whether the parliament takes advantage of the greater power granted to
it under the new constitution thus depends on the party that won the plurality
in the November 2011 parliamentary elections, the Islamist Justice and
Development Party (PJD). As required by the new constitution, the king nominated
PJD Secretary-General Abdellilah Benkirane as prime minister. While
There is a real possibility that the new
constitution’s passage will not be
followed by real political reform.
Marina Ottaway and Marwan Muasher | 7
Superficially, Morocco looks like
a model that all Arab monarchies
would be well advised to follow. Yet,
several factors could still turn the
king’s victory into a pyrrhic one.
the success of the Islamist party worries secularists in Morocco, in reality the
party is unlikely to emerge as a forceful advocate for change. First, it only controls
107 out of the 395 parliamentary seats, with the G-8 coming in a close
second with 101 seats. It will thus be forced to form a coalition government
with the Istiqlal and other smaller parties. Second, the PJD has made it clear
repeatedly that one of its major goals is to be accepted as a legitimate political
player and to become fully integrated into the political system. This desire for
integration was clear in the last parliament, where the PJD,
which had won the second-largest number of seats in the
2007 elections, behaved as an extremely loyal opposition,
never exercising much pressure for change, despite its theoretical
commitment to a stronger parliament.
The king has clearly won the first round of the reform
war. He successfully faced the beginning of an uprising by
positioning himself ahead of the protesters and preempting
their demands. Mohammed has avoided any serious
challenge to his authority and has given the country a new
constitution that looks good on paper but does not force
him to surrender much power. His personal legitimacy remains intact. At
least superficially, Morocco looks like a model that all Arab monarchies would
be well advised to follow, providing a lesson on how even limited top-down
reform, if delivered quickly and graciously, can preempt pressure for more drastic
change from the bottom.
Yet, several factors could still turn the king’s victory into a pyrrhic one.
The new constitution has failed to convince the majority of Moroccans that
the new parliament will play an important role. Voter turnout was only 45
percent. This was an improvement on 2007, when only 37 percent voted, but
not an overwhelming sign of support for the election process, either. In fact,
before the election Moroccan pundits argued that voter participation below 50
percent would constitute a repudiation of the king’s reform and a message that
more is needed. Furthermore, as in 2007, many voters deliberately spoiled their
ballots as a sign of protest.
Most important in the long run is the possible awakening of the extraparliamentary
opposition, including the February 20th movement and the
perennial dark horse of Moroccan politics, the Islamist al-Adl wal-Ihsan movement.
The February 20th protest movement has vowed to continue its fight for
deeper reforms. Thus far, it has attracted little support, with demonstrations in
Rabat and even in the more rambunctious, gritty Casablanca rarely drawing
more than a few thousand protesters. Yet, behind the listless demonstrations
lurks much discontent. Morocco suffers from the same economic ills as other
non-oil-producing Arab countries—high unemployment, particularly among
youth; sluggish growth that suggests a worsening future; a visible contrast
8 | Arab Monarchies: Chance for Reform, Yet Unmet
between the rich and poor; and corruption. These problems exist against a
backdrop of increasingly available information that shows people that their
fate could be avoided. This latter point is strikingly visible in the vast, tightly
packed shantytowns that surround the cities, jungles of rusting corrugated iron
and plastic sheeting where every tumbledown shelter is nevertheless topped by
a small, white satellite dish.
Potentially more important than the February 20th movement itself are the
organizations backing it, particularly al-Adl wal-Ihsan, which is considered to
be the largest Islamist organization in the country (although membership figures
are not available). The group refuses to participate openly in the political
process because it does not accept the legitimacy of the monarchy, the king’s
role as “commander of the faithful,” and a political system it considers highly
corrupt. While expressing support for the February 20th movement, al-Adl
wal-Ihsan has continued to sit on the sidelines. Although it does not encourage
its members to participate in demonstrations, it could quickly become a major
player if protests were to resume, and this could be a game changer.
The king has definitely won the first battle, but the outcome of the war is
far from certain.
Jordan: A Reluctant Drift Toward Reform
Jordan’s response to domestic protests and the regional uprisings has been considerably
more hesitant than Morocco’s. Whereas King Mohammed moved
boldly to stay ahead of the protesters by introducing reforms, King Abdullah II
has thus far only proposed piecemeal reform. Jordan has not experienced largescale
demonstrations; nevertheless, protests have been constant. Demands have
ranged from the political, such as calls for a redistribution of power among the
three branches of government, to the economic, including demands for social
equity and more attention for rural areas outside the capital. The king has
appointed two committees, one to change the electoral law and one to suggest
constitutional amendments, in a partial response to such demands, but there is
no long-term political or economic plan as of yet to address all these challenges.
The difference between Jordan’s and Morocco’s approaches reflects the profound
differences between their political systems. Morocco has a well-developed
party system, making for a parliament where parties can play a potentially
meaningful role. In Jordan, however, the election law and the politics of the
ruling elite have impeded the formation of real political parties. Ultimately, the
Moroccan king was able to announce that he would abide by election results in
the selection of a prime minister. In Jordan though, not only did the king fail
to make such an announcement, but he also could not have done so; political
parties need to develop first.
Marina Ottaway and Marwan Muasher | 9
Widespread Frustration
Jordan enjoys a political system more open than that of many neighboring
countries, with legal political parties, a higher press ceiling, and a leadership
that enjoys legitimacy. This has allowed peaceful and small demonstrations to
take place, dissipating anger. On the downside, however, the containment of
such anger may also have prevented the government from properly evaluating
the implications of what was happening in the entire Arab world and from
embarking on a serious, systematic process of reform. Instead, it is trying to
get by with the minimum.
Protesters’ demands have focused on changes within the regime rather than
on regime change. All constituencies within the country strongly support the
institution of the monarchy. While many want to implement
serious changes to the governance structure, they
also want the king to lead the reform process.
Although the monarchy continues to serve as a security
blanket for all Jordanians regardless of their origin—providing
protection for the country’s various ethnic groups—
frustration has been building in recent years. The people are
frustrated with a system that has promised political reform
too often in the past without serious implementation, and
where economic reform efforts have taken place without a
system of checks and balances. Many Jordanians feel that
the beneficiaries of such reform have been an elite few, rather than the general
public. They are tired of the resilience of a political and a bureaucratic layer that
benefits from a rentier system, in which loyalties are bought with favors and
any reforms that might eliminate its privileges and replace it with a merit-based
system are successfully thwarted.1 Jordanians are united behind a call directed
toward the government to battle corruption, which many believe to have
dramatically increased in the last few years—in Transparency International’s
Corruption Perception Index, Jordan fell from 37th (out of 178 countries) to
56th (out of 182 countries) place between 2003 and 2011. Activists want to
institutionalize changes to the system to do away with corruption at its roots,
not just punish the corrupt individuals as they are caught.
On other issues, Jordanians remain divided by multiple fault lines: not only
between East Bankers and Palestinians, as analysts always simplistically stress,
but also between the haves and the have-nots and between urban and rural
dwellers. Some demands focus on political issues such as the redistribution
of power among the three branches of government and a different method of
choosing the prime minister and cabinet. The increasing role that the intelligence
services have been playing in all aspects of life in the country—going
well beyond security needs—has also left a bitter taste among wide sectors of
Jordanian society. Protesters have thus called for a limit on the role of the intelligence
services in political affairs.
Protesters’ demands in Jordan have
focused on changes within the regime
rather than on regime change. While many
want to implement serious changes to
the governance structure, they also want
the king to lead the reform process.
10 | Arab Monarchies: Chance for Reform, Yet Unmet
The youth movement has been able at times
to cut across all ethnic lines and has the
potential to play an increasingly important
role in the future of the country, given that
70 percent of the population is under 30.
The gap between the haves and have-nots has increased as a result of economic
policies that are perceived to have benefited the elite while neglecting
areas outside of the capital. Advancement on economic and social justice issues
is thus also demanded. Poorer rural governorates in particular are calling for a
more equitable distribution of resources and greater job opportunities.
As in all Arab countries, widespread frustration has found expression in the
rise of an active youth movement. While many of the youth in the country are
politically aware, knowledgeable of their rights, Internet
savvy, and unafraid to raise issues without inhibition, they
also lack political organization. Despite its weaknesses, the
youth movement has been able at times to cut across all
ethnic lines. As such, it has the potential to play an increasingly
important role in the future of the country, given that
70 percent of the population is under 30, particularly if it
succeeds at organizing itself politically and breaking away
from the traditional ethnic, tribal, and religious lines.
Political Reform Efforts Since January 2011
The Arab uprisings, coupled with regular demonstrations around the country
(though the protests have been smaller in size compared to other Arab countries),
forced the political elite to move at least marginally from their regularly
self-serving lip service on reform. First and foremost, in Jordan, a new election
law would be the cornerstone of any serious reform process. The country’s
one-person-one-vote system allows voters to choose only one candidate even
though several are elected from each district—the system favors tribal elites
and local notables while discouraging the formation of political parties. This,
together with the gerrymandering of districts, has produced structurally weak,
unrepresentative parliaments. The election districts are designed to maximize
the number of members of parliament from tribal and rural areas—who are
traditionally dependent on services from the state—at the expense of those
from cities and towns. Unless the system is changed, parliament will continue
to be dominated by tribal elements or other unaffiliated candidates, rather
than by members of political parties, thus perpetuating the rentier state model.
On March 14, the king established a National Dialogue Committee to discuss
this controversial voting system. The National Dialogue Committee has
recommended eliminating the one-person-one-vote formula—an important
step. Unfortunately, these minor amendments are unlikely to produce parliaments
based on strong national parties in the foreseeable future unless the
mixed system of voting they call for includes more than a minimal allotment
of seats to national lists. As of this writing, even these minor amendments have
not been translated into a new election law, which the government of Prime
Minister Awn Khasawneh announced will not be ready to be submitted to
parliament until March.
Marina Ottaway and Marwan Muasher | 11
One major issue that affects the debate
on reform in Jordan is the fragility of a
common Jordanian national identity.
One major issue that affects the debate on reform in Jordan is the fragility
of a common Jordanian national identity. Sixty-five years after independence,
and sixty years after Palestinian refugees from the 1948 war were given full
Jordanian citizenship, the issue remains politically unresolved. Public debate
on national identity is considered divisive and occasional references to it are
emotional, and seldom rational or constructive. The lack of a resolution of
the Arab-Israeli conflict has particularly affected the development of a modern
and healthy national identity and has been used by many, in justified
and unjustified ways, to hamper the political reform process. East Bankers
worry about a dilution of their “East Bank Jordanian”
identity if the election law makes for a more representative
parliament that includes more Jordanians of Palestinian
origin, while Jordanians of Palestinian origin maintain
that they are not fully represented. Debate on the matter
by representatives of both communities has tended to be
highly charged, and the state has not been able to properly
address the issue. The National Dialogue Committee has not been able
to tackle the national identity issue directly either and has failed yet again to
define who is a Jordanian.
In another attempt to address protesters’ demands, on April 27, the king
appointed a committee on constitutional amendments to propose new changes
to a constitution often amended in the past. Skeptics noted that past amendments
have usually strengthened the executive at the expense of the legislature
and judiciary, which is the opposite of what protesters have wanted.
The constitutional committee formulated a set of recommendations that
were approved, with some amendments, by both houses of parliament at the
end of September. The final amendments are positive and important, although
the members of the committee, while well respected, did not include any representatives
of the opposition. Many of the amendments address demands long
put forth by reform groups and the general public. They include the creation
of a constitutional court to monitor the constitutionality of laws and regulations;
the establishment of an independent electoral commission to replace the
Ministry of Interior in organizing elections; the enhancement of civil liberties
and the prohibition of torture in any form; and the limitation of the government’s
ability to issue temporary laws while parliament is not in session. The
amendments also limit the jurisdiction of the State Security Court to cases of
high treason, espionage, and terrorism, with citizens being otherwise tried in
civilian courts; and they stipulate that parliament cannot be dissolved without
the government resigning as well. Furthermore, the outgoing prime minister
will not have the right to be reappointed.
Despite this, the amendments are missing several necessary measures. While
the king has lost the ability to indefinitely postpone elections, all other powers
have been left intact—for example, the monarch still appoints and dismisses
12 | Arab Monarchies: Chance for Reform, Yet Unmet
the prime minister and upper house of parliament. Although the constitutional
committee debated adding gender to the list of categories that are forbidden
from being discriminated against, it opted to keep gender off the list for perceived
religious and political reasons. Finally, while the role of the security
services in the political affairs of the country has been slightly limited through
some amendments, it has hardly been curbed.2
Economic Reform Efforts Since January 2011
Although political reform thus far has been limited, some measures have been
enacted. On the economic front, however, reform has been practically nonexistent.
Former prime minister Ma’rouf al-Bakhit, who was appointed by the
king in February, was not known for being a reformer. Al-Bakhit failed to
formulate a long-term economic strategy to deal with the country’s chronic
problems, including a rising budget deficit that has reached an alarming 11
percent (excluding the foreign grants that traditionally help close the gap
and unemployment that still hovers around an official level of 13 percent).3
He was replaced in October 2011 by Awn Khasawneh, a former judge at the
International Court of Justice who is more reform oriented than his predecessor.
The new government recently won a vote of confidence from parliament
and has not yet announced a long-term economic strategy.
Reforms have been attempted in the past. A strategy to deal with structural
economic problems existed in the National Agenda of 2005. That program
outlined a ten-year plan to eliminate the budget deficit by 2016, excluding
grants. It also aimed to reach a surplus of 1.8 percent and to reduce unemployment
to 6.8 percent by 2017. This strategy though was never implemented,
nor was a new one formulated. Instead, as the situation worsened in light of
the global financial crisis and rising food and energy prices, the government
adopted an expansionary fiscal policy that has added significantly to the problem.
While this might be understandable in the short term, the government
has not introduced a medium-term plan that would assure the maintenance
of fiscal responsibility. Grants such as the $1.4 billion from Saudi Arabia are
neither guaranteed in the future nor will they contribute to solving Jordan’s
structural budget problem where revenues are unable to meet the operational
expenses of the government, let alone any capital expenditures.
A National Employment Strategy that would, among other things, replace
guest workers with local ones was announced in March but has not been published
as of this writing. Furthermore, the government has sent confusing signals
about its policy. In September, for example, the governor of the central
bank was dismissed for his “liberal views,” his belief in a “market economy,”
and his disagreement with the government over its economic policy. The state
has essentially been trying to placate public opinion with a mixture of increased
civil servant salaries, additional subsidies, and the creation of a “development
Marina Ottaway and Marwan Muasher | 13
The economic response to the unrest has
not incorporated any real reform measures.
fund” for rural governorates, which will be financed by the Saudi grant. No
plans have been announced on how the money will be spent. The economic
response to the unrest thus has not incorporated any real
reform measures.
In May, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which
consists of the six Arab Gulf monarchies, announced that
it would welcome Jordan and Morocco as members, and
negotiations started in September. Jordan hopes that full
membership will entail free movement of labor, and thus greater remittances
and lower unemployment. The GCC has also announced a five-year economic
plan to support Jordan, the details of which will be discussed by its heads of
state at their next meeting in December.
The Jordanian public is uncertain about this issue, and the amount of
debate taking place is unprecedented. Many Jordanians are no longer satisfied
with economic measures that may ease their financial plight but also imply
restrictions on political change by an organization representing countries that
have long rejected political reform. While neither the Jordanian government
nor countries like Saudi Arabia have said that there is a political quid pro quo
to GCC membership, many Jordanians suspect that this might, in fact, be
the case. Recent statements by the foreign minister of the UAE that Jordan’s
membership in the GCC does not yet have consensus within the group have
cast further doubt on the issue.
Looking Forward
Jordan’s response to the uprisings thus far has been mixed and ad hoc. The
government still lacks a comprehensive strategy. Politically, the amendments
represent a good first step. They are, however, still far from a more comprehensive,
institutional, inclusive, and measurable reform process that offers a more
extensive vision for Jordan’s future—one that can successfully incorporate the
demands of the different constituencies in a way that leads to a healthy, pluralistic,
and prosperous future for the country. Only an inclusive process of
dialogue that involves all the major forces in society can lead to a common
understanding on charting a course that might finally transition from a rentierbased
system to sustainable development for the country.
One of this piece’s authors recently visited Jordan. On the ground, it was
clear that Jordanians are not satisfied with the reforms thus far, but hope that
the process is more serious and leads to concrete results, rather than another
round of unfulfilled promises. Yet, it is also equally clear that the population—
with all of its ethnic and social diversity and its various political and economic
aspirations—wants the monarch to lead this reform process. The king seems
well aware of the challenge, even recognizing that he must counter the forces
that work for the preservation of the status quo—forces that often come from
14 | Arab Monarchies: Chance for Reform, Yet Unmet
Iran has been a vocal supporter of the
Bahraini protesters and from the point
of view of the government, this external
support is the real cause of continued strife.
within the political elite and traditional constituency of the regime. While the
status quo is unsustainable in Jordan, top-down reform can succeed, and in
fact, it is the only way forward in a country where organized political forces are
weak. The question is whether the political elite who prevented change in the
past will be lulled by the absence of massive protest into believing that it has
weathered the storm and can return to business as usual.
The Gulf States: Still Waiting for Reform
With the exception of Bahrain, the Gulf monarchies have been largely
untouched by turmoil, and they have not taken advantage of the calm to introduce
reforms from the top in order to avoid future problems. Although the
magnitude of the economic benefits they have distributed to their populations
suggests that they are extremely conscious of the potential for turmoil, they
appear unable to take decisive action.
Bahrain: Between the Arab Spring and Iran
Bahrain is the only Gulf monarchy to have experienced large-scale, protracted
protests similar to those of the Arab Spring. Since February, Bahrain has seen
continuous demonstrations, which have been quelled neither by early attempts
to buy off discontent with economic largesse nor by later severe repression,
including an intervention by the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) Peninsula
Shield Force of mostly Saudi and Emirati troops.
Two elements make the situation in Bahrain unlike that
of other Gulf monarchies or of other Arab countries experiencing
widespread popular uprisings. First, protests have
had a strongly sectarian character, pitting overwhelmingly
Shi’i demonstrators against a Sunni-dominated government.
Second, the Bahraini uprising is a reiteration of an
earlier conflict that continued through the 1990s and was
shakily settled by agreement on a new National Action Charter in 2001. As in
the past, the most recent set of protests continue to take place against a backdrop
of Shi’i socioeconomic grievances, as well as in the context of the failed
2001 political agreement which introduced a new constitution and an elected
parliament without curbing the power of the king. Complicating matters further,
Iran has been a vocal supporter of the Bahraini protesters—and from
the point of view of the government, this external support is the real cause of
continued strife.
When the protests first started, the king tried to appease participants by
ordering that every family be granted $3,000 to mark the anniversary of the
National Action Charter. But demands in Bahrain were much more political
than economic and unrest continued. By mid-February, protesters took over
Marina Ottaway and Marwan Muasher | 15
the Pearl Roundabout to demand a functioning democracy, the release of political
prisoners, and the removal of Prime Minister Sheikh Khalifa bin Salman
Al Khalifa, an uncle of the king who has occupied his position since 1971 and
is considered to be highly corrupt. They also demanded more housing and job
opportunities. Attempts to start dialogue between the protesters and the crown
prince failed, despite strong pressure by the United States, which saw negotiations
as the only way to solve not only Bahrain’s predicament, but also its own:
Washington found itself caught between its proclaimed support for the Arab
Spring and the imperative of maintaining good relations with the country that
hosts the American Fifth Fleet.
As the protests escalated, violence and gross violations of human rights by
the police did as well. This was well documented by the Bahrain Independent
Commission of Inquiry, which was given the task of investigating allegations
of human rights abuses during the uprising, as discussed below. In response
to the continued unrest, in March troops from a number of Gulf nations,
including Saudi Arabia, arrived in Bahrain at the request of the government.
Although such repression failed to restore social peace, it calmed the situation
sufficiently for the government to attempt a new dialogue with the opposition
in July, in an effort to draw up “common principles for the relaunch of the
political reform process.” The government invited a wide array of largely progovernment
groups to participate in the dialogue, while giving only a few seats
to the al-Wefaq political society, the largest Shi’i bloc in parliament. Inevitably,
al-Wefaq soon withdrew from the talks and the dialogue became a conversation
among pro-government forces. Equally ineffective was a second attempt by the
king to increase the salaries of civilian and military personnel and pensioners.
In a more meaningful concession, the king established the Bahrain
Independent Commission of Inquiry to investigate the government’s response
to the February protests. Headed by M. Cherif Bassiouni, a respected jurist
with experience in conducting war crimes investigations, the commission presented
a surprisingly candid report on November 23. It denounced gross and
systemic violations of human rights, as well as measures that amounted to “collective
punishment” of the Shi’i community. It suggested that the government
needed to undertake a systematic investigation of its policies and to retrain its
security forces to deal with unrest. Initial responses by the government suggest
that it intends to comply with the letter of the recommendations but not with
the spirit—it failed to include credible members of the opposition or even independents
in the committee it set up to devise a plan to implement the Bassiouni
Commission’s recommendations.
No measure has succeeded thus far in breaking the Bahraini cycle of protest
and repression. Furthermore, a settlement appears to be a distant prospect as
the government increasingly portrays all Shi’i opponents as radicals close to
Iran and the protesters harden their position, demanding a transition to a true
constitutional monarchy rather than mere political reform.
16 | Arab Monarchies: Chance for Reform, Yet Unmet
Saudi action seems to imply thus far
that reform is inevitable and even
acceptable in many countries, except
within the Kingdom’s own borders
and in neighboring Bahrain.
Saudi Arabia: Buying Domestic Peace
The wave of protests across the Arab region has been both a domestic and foreign
policy challenge for Saudi Arabia, forcing it to pursue contradictory policies.
Domestically, the Saudi regime has taken an extremely firm stance against
all manifestations of discontent while at the same time lavishing a vast amount
of money on salary increases, housing benefits, and support
for a broad range of institutions throughout the Kingdom.
In its foreign policy, however, Saudi Arabia has been forced
to come to terms with the demise of the Ben Ali regime in
Tunisia and the Mubarak regime in Egypt; it is trying to
ease President Saleh out of power in Yemen, joining other
Arab countries in supporting Western intervention to
remove Qaddafi in Libya, and voting to expel Syria from
the Arab League. Closer to home, however, Saudi Arabia
has dismissed the Bahraini uprising as the result of Iranian machinations. On
March 14, the Kingdom responded to a “request by Bahrain for support” to
clear activists from the streets after the imposition of emergency rule and sent
at least 1,200 troops across the causeway as part of the Peninsula Shield operation.
Saudi action seems to imply thus far that reform is inevitable and even
acceptable in many countries, except within the Kingdom’s own borders and
in neighboring Bahrain.
The Saudi public has remained passive so far. An attempt led by youth
in late February to call for a “Day of Rage” on Facebook fizzled. Although
hundreds reportedly signed up online to participate, only a small group of foreign
reporters and a lone protester showed up at the appointed time and place.
Limited protests eventually took place in Riyadh, where a gathering of a few
dozen family members of prisoners who had not been charged or tried gathered
in front of the Ministry of Interior, and in the Eastern Province town of Qatif,
where several hundred Shi’a (a minority in Saudi Arabia, but a majority in the
Eastern Province) demonstrated several times throughout the month of March
and again in November and December. A small number of women also continued
to demand the right to drive, engaging in civil defiance by driving around
Jeddah and Riyadh, despite a countrywide ban. The limited number of participants
and their chaperoning by family members (as required by law), however,
indicates that Saudi Arabia is far from witnessing an uprising by women.
The absence of political pressure from below allowed the Kingdom to avoid
any real discussion of political reform. The government has announced the
formation of an anticorruption commission and some measures to improve the
efficiency of the judiciary. It also said that women would be allowed to vote
and run for office in the next municipal elections, which are set to take place
in 2015. The impact of this announcement was limited by its timing, however,
coming just after the most recent municipal elections were held.
Marina Ottaway and Marwan Muasher | 17
Despite the extremely limited nature of protests thus far, the government
remains worried about the possibility that the Arab Spring protests may overtake
Saudi Arabia as well. This fear is shown by the extraordinary amounts
the government has allocated to support economic measures meant to stave off
discontent. Expanded budgets and economic measures have not been allocated
to support economic reform or new economic initiatives but rather to place
more cash in the pockets of individuals and families.
Within weeks of the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, King Abdullah
announced a set of economic measures that added up to $37 billion and
included a 15 percent pay raise for state employees.4 The package also incorporated
loan benefits, social security assistance, education funding, and the
creation of jobs, among other grants and subsidies.5 Just days after the fizzled
“Day of Rage,” King Abdullah appeared in a rare televised address in which
he praised the population for displaying national unity and loyalty in the face
of “advocates of sedition”; in other words, he commended the Saudi Arabian
people for failing to take to the streets. He then issued a royal decree which
gave an additional $93 billion to various programs. Part of the funds were
allocated as new handouts to the population in the form of unemployment
benefits, housing, and improved health care. The remaining portion was dedicated
to strengthening the country’s religious institutions.
The latter provisions show how the Kingdom has attempted to use religion
as an antidote to political protests. About $53 million was allocated to establish
a bureau for the General Presidency for Religious Research and Ifta, including
the creation of 300 jobs; $133.32 million for the renovation of mosques; $53
million to support the country’s Holy Quran Memorization
Associations; $80 million for the Bureau of Call and
Guidance at the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments,
Call and Guidance; and $53 million to complete regional
headquarters for the Commission for the Promotion
of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice. Funding has also
been provided to establish a Fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence)
complex. Although the decrees involved the creation of a
commission to combat corruption and other potentially
positive developments, they also involved a prohibition on the defaming of the
grand mufti and the members of the Senior Ulema Council in the media, raising
questions on essential issues like censorship and freedom of speech.6
Saudi Arabia remains largely untouched by the popular uprisings spreading
across the Arab world. The extensive benefits provided to the population
suggest, however, that the government does not believe that Saudi Arabia is
immune to the unrest that has shaken other countries.
The extensive benefits provided
to the population suggest that the
government does not believe that
Saudi Arabia is immune to the unrest
that has shaken other countries.
18 | Arab Monarchies: Chance for Reform, Yet Unmet
Qatar: Supporting Change—But Not at Home
Qatar presents a unique case of a country internally untouched by either unrest
or reform but supporting reform and regime change elsewhere.
Domestically, not much has happened in Qatar since the beginning of the
Arab Spring. The absence of demonstrations and demands for change have
given the government the freedom to maintain the status quo, not resorting to
economic measures that a number of other monarchies have attempted to buy
peace and taking only small, inconsequential political steps.
In a surprise move on November 1, Emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani
announced that, for the first time, two-thirds of the Shura Council positions
would be contested in elections in 2013. In itself, this announcement is not a
significant step, as the Shura Council enjoys little power. The decision, however,
is telling about Qatar’s attempt to manage its image by realigning its
domestic policies, however minimally, with its support for change elsewhere.
Throughout the Arab Spring, Qatar has played an active role: it has sought to
mediate between the government and protesters in Yemen and Syria; it was one
of the main drivers of the Arab League’s decision to expel Syria in November;
it has offered $500 million in aid to Egypt in order to support the transition;
and it provided military training and weapons to the Libyan insurgents early
in the uprising—a complete picture of the extent of Qatar’s role in Libya still
remains unclear.
Oman: Calls for Reform Rather Than Regime Overthrow
Normally quiet and politically uneventful, Oman was the first Gulf country
to experience unrest after the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt. Throughout
January and February, small-scale demonstrations broke out in several cities
with demands for a more powerful Shura Council, anticorruption measures,
and greater employment opportunities. Despite dissatisfaction, calls stopped
short of demands for a true constitutional monarchy, let alone Sultan Qaboos
bin Said’s ouster. In an effort to quell continued demands and with the help of
a Saudi Arabian pledge that provided Oman with a $10 billion grant over ten
years, the sultan increased the minimum salaries of private sector workers by
43 percent, raised the stipend received by university students, and announced
the creation of a consumer protection bureau, while also reshuffling the cabinet.
In March, Qaboos promised the creation of 50,000 jobs, the broadening
of legislative powers for the country’s consultative council, and an additional
$2.6 billion package of benefits.
Although these handouts were sufficient to placate most protesters, a small,
determined group continued to express their dissatisfaction. In an attempt to
eliminate the last vestiges of unrest, in May, Sultan Qaboos broached the idea
of increasing decentralization to make the administration more responsive to
the needs of the citizens, ordering feasibility studies for the establishment of
Marina Ottaway and Marwan Muasher | 19
governorates in all regions across the country. He also announced the development
of a second public university.
As protests continued in October, Qaboos finally addressed calls for political
reforms by introducing a number of amendments to the country’s Basic
Law, or constitution. Under the new changes, the Council of Ministers must
now refer draft laws to the Shura Council, rather than issuing them without
consultation. The Shura Council will also review the annual budget and development
projects, as well as have a say in deciding the successor to the throne,
in theory giving the people a greater voice in governmental affairs.
Ultimately, although the government’s gradual economic and minimal
political concessions leave many demands unanswered, Sultan Qaboos continues
to enjoy popular support and a sense of stability pervades the country.
The United Arab Emirates: Absence of Protests
and Preventive Development Measures
With a population that is largely content due to extensive housing and social
security benefits, a high GDP, and an impressive quality of life, the United
Arab Emirates has been left untouched by the region’s unrest. Yet, the government
is taking no chances. In April, it promptly arrested five bloggers who had
called for democratic reforms on the UAE’s Hewar website, a discussion forum
established in 2009 to promote open debate of national issues. From March
to May, it entered into negotiations with major suppliers to reduce and fix the
prices of up to 200 staple food products. At the same time, it stepped up efforts
to improve conditions in the poorer, less developed areas of the north, investing
$1.55 billion in infrastructure projects to expand water and electricity supplies.
On the political front, the government has not taken on any major initiatives.
However, it continued the process of increasing the number of elected
members of the Federal National Council, a body that oversees federal legislation
as well as the number of citizens allowed to cast votes. On September 24,
it held elections for 20 seats of the 40-member Federal National Council; the
remaining 20 seats were directly appointed and the council only serves an advisory
role, however.7 Somewhat more significant is the fact the 129,000 citizens
were allowed to vote in these elections, nearly 20 times more than were eligible
in the UAE’s first elections.8 Voter turnout was low, however.
Kuwait: A Dysfunctional Parliamentary
System Faces the Arab Spring
There has been considerable turmoil in Kuwait since the onset of the Arab
Spring. Yet, Kuwait, the only Gulf monarchy with a real parliament that is
willing to challenge the ruler, is always in a state of turmoil, so it is unclear
whether recent developments are related in any way to the regional upheaval—
Kuwaitis, convinced their country is truly exceptional, claim that they are not.
20 | Arab Monarchies: Chance for Reform, Yet Unmet
The relationship between the ruling family, whose members control the most
important ministries, and the parliament, a mixture of scions of historically
powerful families and politicians of all possible coloration, is always complex.
Parliament frequently challenges the regime, summoning ministers, including
those from the royal family, for “grilling”—just the word used to denote
what in most other countries would be called “testifying” says a lot about relations
between the government and parliament. In return,
the emir tends to disband the parliament and call for new
elections to avoid putting members of the ruling family on
the stand. Given the normal state of turmoil in Kuwaiti
politics, it is, at this point, impossible to determine
whether recent political strife represents something that is
qualitatively different or is simply the continuation of the
same game, particularly since protest has been muted. In
February, Kuwait witnessed protests when Bidoon (stateless
Arabs) took to the streets to demand citizenship. Although this was not a
new demand, clashes between security forces and demonstrators ensued, leading
to a number of arrests and injuries. As demonstrations continued through
March, the Kuwaiti cabinet resigned in order to avoid the “grilling” of three
ministers. The emir formed a new cabinet, but the new government’s relations
with the parliament remained as contentious as ever. Again, protesters called
for the removal of Prime Minister Sheikh Nasser Al-Mohammed Al Sabah
and the granting of greater political freedoms. Tension continued to mount.
In June, two Kuwaiti citizens were arrested and put on trial for criticizing the
ruling families in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, as well Kuwait’s emir. A June
statement by the emir warned that Kuwait would show “zero tolerance” to
anyone threatening the country’s security. Still, unrest continued, fueled by
accusations of corruption against ministers, leading the government to approve
a record budget of $70 billion, of which 90 percent was set to go to fuel subsidies
and salary increases in the hope of buying off discontent.9 In November,
dozens of protesters stormed parliament and demanded the resignation of the
prime minister, indicating that discontent remains.
In response to the turmoil, the emir dismissed the government on November
28 rather than allowing the prime minister to be subjected to a grilling; then
on December 6 he disbanded the parliament, opening the way for new elections
in sixty days. In the meantime, government ministers and members of
parliament continue to trade accusations of corruption.
Kuwait may have reached a turning point, but it is more likely that the current
unrest is part of the same competition among rival elites that keeps the
politics of Kuwait perpetually turbulent while the system remains intact.
Given the normal state of turmoil in Kuwaiti
politics, it is impossible to determine
whether recent political strife represents
something that is qualitatively different or
is simply the continuation of the same game
Marina Ottaway and Marwan Muasher | 21
Conclusion
The potential for reform from the top is high in all Arab monarchies. The
legitimacy Arab monarchs still enjoy could potentially protect them from the
danger that all reforming monarchs experience, what Samuel Huntington
defined as “the king’s dilemma”: any reform could trigger demands for more
radical change and in the end lead to the demise of the reforming sovereign.
There is never a guarantee against the law of unintended consequences, but
uncontrolled calls for change seem unlikely in the Arab monarchies where
demand from the citizens has so far been very limited. Indeed, it would appear
less dangerous for the monarchs to act now than to wait until the demand is
overwhelming and could indeed spiral into an uncontrolled process.
Only Bahrain may have reached the point where it may be difficult for the
king to control the reform process. The country is caught in a new round of
strife, repression, and unsatisfied political demands like the one that engulfed
it in the 1990s. In the eyes of the country’s Shi’i majority, the monarchy has
already lost much of its legitimacy. It seems unlikely at this point that discontent
could be quelled except by reforms that truly curb the power of the king.
But stonewalling on reform does not appear to be a solution either. During
2011, the absence of reform has led more of the protesters to demand a true
constitutional monarchy or, in the case of the more radical voices, a republic.
There should be a cautionary tale here for other countries.
The response of the various states so far has been more of a continuation
of past policies than a clear indication of the willingness to embark on a process
of change. In Morocco, the king swiftly announced a new constitution
curbing the monarch’s powers and enhancing those of the elected parliament.
Closer analysis suggests that in reality the king may not have to surrender
much power because the political parties still appear to be unwilling or unable
to play a more decisive role. This could lead to stalled reform or to an uprising
if the extra parliamentary political organizations mobilize.
Continuity with the past is also striking in Jordan. Once again, the king
has promised reform and created commissions to make proposals, but little has
changed in practice and it is far from certain that the country has reached a
turning point.
Saudi Arabia has reacted to the potential for unrest by using its wealth to buy
off discontent, lavishing benefits on the general public and special constituencies.
The words “political reform” have seemingly never been uttered by Saudis
in official positions; and while the government took a tiny step in the direction
of social reform when it announced that women will be allowed to vote and
even run for office in the municipal election four years hence, the timing of the
announcement, when elections are still far off, decreased its political significance.
22 | Arab Monarchies: Chance for Reform, Yet Unmet
Arab monarchies have not accepted
that the change sweeping the region is
profound, and that the unique opportunity
they still have to lead their countries
into a decisive program of reform
from the top will not last forever.
Usually quiet Oman has experienced some unrest but has reacted, again
in keeping with the past, with mild steps and little repression. The United
Emirates and Qatar have not been challenged and thus have not had to make
tough decisions. Kuwait meanwhile still seems to be caught in the same old
struggle between the parliament and the ruling family, and it remains unclear
whether recent demonstrations and protests mark a turning point away from
an intense political game played by elites and toward the
realm of political participation by a larger public.
Despite the continuity with the past and thus the differences
among them, Arab monarchies seem to share a common
trait in their reaction to the Arab Spring. So far, they
have not accepted that the change sweeping the region is
profound, and that the unique opportunity they still have
to lead their countries into a decisive program of reform
from the top will not last forever. With the possible exception
of the king in Bahrain, Arab monarchs still have legitimacy
in the eyes of their citizens. Protesters are asking for
an enhanced role for the parliament and some limitations to the king’s power,
rather than for a full-fledged constitutional monarchy. Demands for a republican
form of government are rare. Any Arab sovereign willing to introduce real
political reforms would be acclaimed by his citizens and go down in history as
the person who started realigning Arab monarchies with twenty-first-century
governance systems, without completely renouncing his political role. None
has risen to the challenge so far.
Notes
23
1 See Marwan Muasher, A Decade of Struggling Reform Efforts in Jordan: The Resilience
of the Rentier System, Carnegie Paper, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
May 2011.
2 See Marwan Muasher, “Jordan’s Proposed Constitutional Amendments—A
First Step in the Right Direction,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Commentary, August 17, 2011, http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/08/17/jordans-
proposed-constitutional-amendments-first-step-in-right-direction/4rmv.
3 An estimated average of 10.7 percent of GDP excluding grants (JD1.6 billion)
in 2009–2010 to an average of 11.4 percent of GDP in 2011–2012, according to
Economist Intelligence Unit estimates.
4 “Saudi Arabia imposes ban on all protests,” BBC News, March 5, 2011, www.bbc.
co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12656744.
5 P. K. Abdul Ghafour, “King issues decrees to solve housing, economic, unemployment
problems,” Arab News, February 23, 2011, http://arabnews.com/saudiarabia/
article281253.ece.
6 “King Abdullah addresses Saudi people, issues royal decrees,” Royal Embassy
of Saudi Arabia, March 18, 2011, http://www.saudiembassy.net/latest_news/
news03181102.aspx.
7 Mahmoud Habboush, “UAE’s second election has low turnout,” Reuters, September
25, 2011, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/09/24/uk-emirates-electionsidUKTRE78N2N620110924.
8 “UAE leader promises more political rights to citizens,” Reuters, November 15,
2011, http://af.reuters.com/article/commoditiesNews/idAFL5E7MF2WJ20111115.
9 Liam Stack, “Seeking to Avoid Uprising, Kuwait Escalates Budget,” New York
Times, June 30, 2011, www.nytimes.com/2011/07/01/world/middleeast/01kuwait.
html?_r=3.
27
About the Authors
Marina Ottaway is a Senior Associate in the Carnegie Endowment’s
Middle East Program. She works on issues of political transformation in the
Middle East and Gulf security. A long-time analyst of the formation and transformation
of political systems, she has also written on political reconstruction
in Iraq, the Balkans, and African countries.
Her extensive research experience is reflected in her publications, which
include nine authored books and six edited ones. Her most recent publications
include Getting to Pluralism, co-authored with Amr Hamzawy and Yemen on
the Brink, co-edited with Christopher Boucek. She is also the author of Iraq:
Elections 2010, an online guide to Iraqi politics.
Marwan Muasher is vice president for studies at the Carnegie
Endowment, where he oversees the Endowment’s research in Washington and
Beirut on the Middle East. Muasher served as foreign minister (2002–2004)
and deputy prime minister (2004–2005) of Jordan, and his career has spanned
the areas of diplomacy, development, civil society, and communications. He
was also a senior fellow at Yale University. He is the author of The Arab Center:
The Promise of Moderation (Yale University Press, 2008).
Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace is a private, nonprofit
organization dedicated to advancing cooperation between nations and promoting
active international engagement by the United States. Founded in 1910, its
work is nonpartisan and dedicated to achieving practical results.
As it celebrates its Centennial, the Carnegie Endowment is pioneering the
first global think tank, with flourishing offices now in Washington, Moscow,
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governance and the places whose political evolution and international policies
will most determine the near-term possibilities for international peace and
economic advance.
The Carnegie Middle East Program combines in-depth local knowledge
with incisive comparative analysis to examine economic, sociopolitical, and
strategic interests in the Arab world. Through detailed country studies and the
exploration of key cross-cutting themes, the Carnegie Middle East Program,
in coordination with the Carnegie Middle East Center, provides analysis and
recommendations in both English and Arabic that are deeply informed by
knowledge and views from the region. The Carnegie Middle East Program
has special expertise in political reform and Islamist participation in pluralistic
politics throughout the region.
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