The loss of prominent leaders and relentless pursuit by the military coalition in Mali may spell the end of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb across the entire Sahel, local analysts say.
By Jemal Oumar and Bakari Gueye in Nouakchott for Magharebia
The death knell is sounding for al-Qaeda’s North African branch.
As the African and French military campaign against terrorists in northern Mali entered its second month, the Ifoghas Mountains turned from sanctuary to graveyard for several high-profile leaders of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).
The first to fall was perhaps the biggest name: Abdelhamid Abou Zeid. Within days, Chadian troops claimed the killing of Mokhtar Belmokhtar, aka Khaled Abou El Abbas, or “Laaouar”, the mastermind of the January In Amenas siege that left 37 civilians dead.
The newest al-Qaeda chief, El Kairouani Abu Abdelhamid al-Kidali, was also reportedly eliminated on March 7th by French and Chadian forces in Aguelhok.
“The fall of those leaders has undoubtedly and greatly affected the morale and military force of AQIM,” Sahara Media director Ahmed Ould Abah says.
“Abou Zeid and Khaled Abou El Abbas helped establish AQIM in the region and brought over the most committed and loyal elements to their line of terrorism,” he adds.
But all the fighters who flocked to the Sahel desert and northern Mali are now being picked off by airstrikes and ground troops. Replacing them will not be easy.
“The jihadists aren’t numerous enough to send reinforcements to all the fronts in the world,” Ould Abah says.
“Syria, Yemen and Somalia already distract their efforts,” he adds.
The true abilities and size of al-Qaeda had been exaggerated, observers note. The organisation is now facing a major military offensive from which there is no escape.
“The entry of France and African allies constituted the strongest blow to the terrorist groups in the Sahel. Therefore, it is only natural that the leaders would fall,” Mauritanian security analyst Mahmoudi Ould Salem tells Magharebia.
“They realise quite well that they are fighting on land that doesn’t serve them geographically, against a force that is far superior both militarily and technically. In addition, the local populations themselves are against them,” he adds.
It is unlikely that the terrorists in northern Mali will receive any external support from global jihadists looking for a field of battle, he adds.
The reason for the expected attrition, according to the Mauritanian security expert, is that Laaouar, Droukdel, El Hammam and other AQIM terrorists had a hard time persuading global jihadists to join their cause, “because of their involvement in crimes, such as the kidnapping of children and women, and their ties to arms smuggling and human trafficking”.
The inability to draw recruits may prove AQIM’s undoing, according to Sy Djibril of SOS Pairs Educateurs Association, a Nouakchott youth development agency.
From witnessing religious revival associations spread jihadist ideology in the 1980’s to working today with at-risk youth, he has a unique perspective on the recruitment issue.
“The loss of al-Qaeda’s prominent leaders means that the group will lose the networks of relations in the desert, experience, money and ability to convince young people,” he says.
There will also be disputes among the likely successors, Djibril adds.
“The backbone of terrorist groups has been broken,” he concludes. “Therefore, those who stay alive will focus on protecting themselves first against liquidation in the coming period.”
Internal rivalries fracture terror groups
AQIM is being torn apart by major disagreements between its leaders. And with Abdelhamid Abou Zeid dead, the net is closing in on those who remain.
Over the past few weeks, Algerian troops increased their presence along the Mali border to starve terrorists of support from smuggling rings and prevent them from retreating to Algeria. Mauritania has done the same.
But the internal devolution of the terror organisation actually began years ago.
Analyst and historian Sidati Ould Cheikh recalls that “for a long time, Mokhtar Belmokhtar was the undisputed ruler of the jihadist networks in southern Algeria initially and later in northern Mali”.
In 1992, he was appointed head of Sahara operations by the Armed Islamic Group (GIA).
Belmokhtar switched allegiance six years later and left with his supporters to join the nascent AQIM. He had fallback positions in the Algerian Sahara region of Tanezrouft and the adjacent area of northern Mali, but chose to focus on Mauritania as a target for violence.
He also collaborated with smuggling networks, earning himself the sobriquet “Mr. Marlboro”.
But the transformation of the GSPC into AQIM encouraged Abou Zeid’s rise to power in south-eastern Algeria. He swelled the ranks of his own branch by pulling off an increasing number of exploits, Ould Cheikh explains.
“Abou Zeid’s activities were soon noticed by Al Qaeda’s core leadership, which established direct contact with him. This marked the beginning of the rivalry between the two men,” he says.
Ould Cheikh adds: “It was Abou Zeid who made the decision in December 2008 to bring the jihadist violence to the Sahel and in particular Niger, which had thus far been spared by AQIM.”
He ordered the abduction of the UN Secretary-General’s representative in Niamey and his deputy, both Canadian nationals. He also arranged the seizure of four European tourists and, after consulting the central command of al-Qaeda, had one of them – British national Edwin Dyer – executed in May 2009.
In so doing, he broke with the policy of negotiation which AQIM in general, and Belmokhtar in particular, that he had previously espoused.
“In a further effort to bring matters to a head, Abou Zeid challenged Belmokhtar in his own back yard by ordering the murder in Timbuktu of a Malian officer in June 2009, triggering a series of conflicts in the north of the country,” the historian adds.
“These rivalries became more intense over the years and were utterly damaging to the cohesion and efficiency of the terrorist organisation.”
Abdou Ould Mohamed, an analyst, says that “the disagreements just continued to grow”.
In 2012, AQIM chiefAbdelmalek Droukdel (aka Abou Moussaab Abdelouadoud) threatened his former protégé.
Abou Zeid went from being favoured son to sworn enemy.
According to Algerian security forces, the dispute arose over money. Abou Zeid reportedly refused to share ransom money.
Ould Mohamed adds: “This threat coincided with the appointment of AQIM’s newest Sahara emir: 34-year-old Algerian Jamel Oukacha, (aka Yahya Abou El Hammam).”
He got the post after his predecessor, Nabil Abu Alqama, died in a Mali car crash.
According to Ba Bokar, a professor of international relations, “the disagreements within Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb became more pronounced after the Libya conflict, which was to Abou Zeid’s advantage”.
“Becoming increasingly unruly, he set about creating his own network with the help of Libyan insurgents, who enabled him to acquire sophisticated weapons,” he tells Magharebia.
In Bokar’s view, “what is happening between the terrorist leaders in Mali is no longer a battle over leadership or the sharing of proceeds; it is about who will control the Sahel”.
“At stake are huge sums of money earned from ransoms, arms and drug trafficking, smuggling and illegal migration,” he adds.
“So it’s a war within a war which does not help the terrorists, who are getting burnt in the fire that they started themselves,” Bokar says.
