FROM THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT
Thanks to the revolutions in the Arab world, 2011 will be remembered as a year of extraordinary political change, in which popular resistance to authoritarian rule scored some notable successes. However, for democracy worldwide developments in the past year have been decidedly mixed. Indeed, the results of the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index 2011 show that democracy has been under stress in many parts of the world. Economic crisis has contributed to a backsliding in democracy in many countries—particularly in Europe.
The Democracy Index provides a snapshot of the state of democracy worldwide for 165 independent states and two territories. It ranks each country on criteria such as whether elections are free and fair, whether civil liberties are respected, and whether the political culture allows democracy in the fullest sense to flourish. Depending on its ranking, each country is placed into one of four categories: full democracy, flawed democracy, hybrid regime or authoritarian regime.
In 2011 there has been little change at the top of the rankings, which unsurprisingly are dominated by Scandinavian countries and other affluent liberal democracies such as New Zealand and Canada. Equally, the countries bringing up the very bottom of the list—that is, those we consider to be the world’s most repressive and authoritarian regimes—still include the usual suspects. North Korea is bottom, in 167th position, with Chad, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan just above it.
But the 2011 index also sees significant changes, both for better and for worse. The biggest gainer is Tunisia, which not only initiated the Arab Spring but which has had the most success so far in translating revolution into democratic progress. Its score (out of 10) has risen by a massive 2.74 points, and it has jumped 53 places up the rankings to 92nd. It has also moved from an authoritarian to a hybrid regime. Underscoring the historic nature of the Arab revolutions, Libya and Egypt are the two countries with the next-greatest gains in this year’s index. But consolidating newfound freedoms remains fraught with difficulty. Libya’s National Transitional Council faces a monumental task in building new state structures virtually from scratch, while in Egypt continuing turbulence attests to dissatisfaction with the course of post-revolution events and profound disagreement over the country’s future political direction.
Despite such problems, the Democracy Index 2011 is positive overall for the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). It is one of only two regions in the world to record an improvement in its average score since last year; the other is Sub-Saharan Africa, where Mauritania and Niger have moved from authoritarian to hybrid regimes and where Zambia has moved up to the flawed-democracy category. Along with MENA, Sub-Saharan Africa contains the biggest gainers in this year’s index. The region seems to be benefiting gradually from a secular improvement in politics that has seen the number of coups fall sharply since the late 1990s, and the number of elections increase. But it should not be forgotten that progress has come from a low base. Only one state in the region, the island of Mauritius, is a full democracy. Authoritarian regimes still predominate, and armed conflict, human-rights abuses and failed governments remain widespread.
European reversals
Elsewhere, the general picture is of a decline in democracy in 2011, most notably in Europe. Seven countries in western Europe now have lower democracy scores compared with last year; none has a higher score. The main reason has been the erosion of sovereignty associated with the effects of, and responses to, the euro zone crisis. Most dramatically, in two countries (Italy and Greece) democratically elected leaders have been replaced by technocrats. Policy in some countries is no longer being set by national legislatures and elected politicians, but in effect by official creditors, the European Central Bank, the European Commission and the IMF. Moreover, there is growing distrust of politicians and public institutions, accompanied in some cases by a worrying degree of political apathy.
Eastern Europe also provides abundant cause for concern. More than a third of the 28 countries in the region recorded lower democracy scores in 2011, and this on the back of large declines between 2008 and 2010. The most high-profile offender this year is Russia. We have lowered our democracy score for Russia, to reflect the chilling impact on the country’s political health of the decision by Vladimir Putin, the prime minister, to return to the presidency in 2012. The December 4th parliamentary election was also deeply flawed. As a result, Russia descends from the hybrid-regime category into the ranks of authoritarian regimes. Ukraine has also fallen sharply down our rankings. The regime’s harassment of opposition figures is exemplified by the jailing of former prime minister Yuliya Tymoshenko on what most believe are politically motivated charges.
Democracy in 2012
Will the Arab Spring bear further fruit, or even inspire movements for political renewal in other regions? Or will the backsliding witnessed in Europe, the US and elsewhere continue? Inevitably a high degree of uncertainty surrounds any attempt to predict specific regimes’ survival or demise. But certain broad points are worth stressing.
One of the more worrying developments of the past five years has been an erosion of previously attained democratisation. The financial crisis in 2008 exacerbated this trend, causing governments to become more inward-looking and prompting rises in populism and anti-immigrant sentiment. In this context, the near-term political prospects for Europe look disturbing. Austerity, recession and increased strains on the structural integrity of the EU as a result of the euro crisis could present challenges for democracy in the year ahead. That said, economic crisis is not inevitably associated with political stasis or regression towards authoritarianism; it can also be a catalyst for change. The Arab uprisings were provoked in part by economic hardships, compounding resentment of corruption and nepotism.
The vulnerability of authoritarian states varies greatly, and is affected by factors such as electoral fraud, ill-planned leadership successions, and “neighbourhood effects” (without Tunisia, in other words, there would have been no revolution in Egypt). Hopes that the Arab Spring might unleash a wave of democratisation have yet to be fully realised, and in some cases calls for political reform have prompted brutal responses—Syria being a conspicuous example. But even the most apparently “stable” regime is secure only in comparison with other autocracies. China, for instance, which rates as one of the least vulnerable authoritarian states, faces a slowing economy and a leadership transition in late 2012 and early 2013—a potentially dangerous combination.
With global economic pressures certain to intensify next year, lower oil prices likely to reduce resource-rich authoritarian states’ ability to buy off dissent, and ongoing protest movements in MENA, Russia and elsewhere likely to remain highly visible, who would bet against further dramatic changes?
Democracy Index 2011 | |||||
Country | 2011 rank | 2011 score | 2010 rank | 2010 score | 2011 regime type |
Norway | 1 | 9.80 | 1 | 9.80 | Full democracy |
Iceland | 2 | 9.65 | 2 | 9.65 | Full democracy |
Denmark | 3 | 9.52 | 3 | 9.52 | Full democracy |
Sweden | 4 | 9.50 | 4 | 9.50 | Full democracy |
New Zealand | 5 | 9.26 | 5 | 9.26 | Full democracy |
Australia | 6 | 9.22 | 6 | 9.22 | Full democracy |
Switzerland | 7 | 9.09 | 8 | 9.09 | Full democracy |
Canada | 8 | 9.08 | 9 | 9.08 | Full democracy |
Finland | 9 | 9.06 | 7 | 9.19 | Full democracy |
Netherlands | 10 | 8.99 | 10 | 8.99 | Full democracy |
Luxembourg | 11 | 8.88 | 11 | 8.88 | Full democracy |
Ireland | 12 | 8.56 | 12 | 8.79 | Full democracy |
Austria | 13 | 8.49 | 13 | 8.49 | Full democracy |
Germany | 14 | 8.34 | 14 | 8.38 | Full democracy |
Malta | 15 | 8.28 | 15 | 8.28 | Full democracy |
Czech Republic | 16 | 8.19 | 16 | 8.19 | Full democracy |
Uruguay | 17 | 8.17 | 21 | 8.10 | Full democracy |
United Kingdom | 18 | 8.16 | 19 | 8.16 | Full democracy |
United States | 19 | 8.11 | 17 | 8.18 | Full democracy |
Costa Rica | 20 | 8.10 | 25 | 8.04 | Full democracy |
Japan | 21 | 8.08 | 22 | 8.08 | Full democracy |
South Korea | 22 | 8.06 | 20 | 8.11 | Full democracy |
Belgium | 23 | 8.05 | 23 | 8.05 | Full democracy |
Mauritius | 24 | 8.04 | 24 | 8.04 | Full democracy |
Spain | 25 | 8.02 | 18 | 8.16 | Full democracy |
Cape Verde | 26 | 7.92 | 27 | 7.94 | Flawed democracy |
Portugal | 27 | 7.81 | 26 | 8.02 | Flawed democracy |
South Africa | 28 | 7.79 | 30 | 7.79 | Flawed democracy |
France | 29 | 7.77 | 31 | 7.77 | Flawed democracy |
Slovenia | 30 | 7.76 | 32 | 7.69 | Flawed democracy |
Italy | 31 | 7.74 | 29 | 7.83 | Flawed democracy |
Greece | 32 | 7.65 | 28 | 7.92 | Flawed democracy |
Botswana | 33 | 7.63 | 35 | 7.63 | Flawed democracy |
Estonia | 34 | 7.61 | 33 | 7.68 | Flawed democracy |
Chile | 35 | 7.54 | 34 | 7.67 | Flawed democracy |
Israel | 36 | 7.53 | 37 | 7.48 | Flawed democracy |
Taiwan | 37 | 7.46 | 36 | 7.52 | Flawed democracy |
Slovakia | 38 | 7.35 | 38 | 7.35 | Flawed democracy |
India | 39 | 7.30 | 40 | 7.28 | Flawed democracy |
Cyprus | 40 | 7.29 | 39 | 7.29 | Flawed democracy |
Lithuania | 41 | 7.24 | 41 | 7.24 | Flawed democracy |
Timor-Leste | 42 | 7.22 | 42 | 7.22 | Flawed democracy |
Trinidad and Tobago | 43 | 7.16 | 45 | 7.16 | Flawed democracy |
Jamaica | 44 | 7.13 | 44 | 7.21 | Flawed democracy |
Poland | 45 | 7.12 | 48 | 7.05 | Flawed democracy |
Brazil | =45 | 7.12 | 47 | 7.12 | Flawed democracy |
Panama | 47 | 7.08 | 46 | 7.15 | Flawed democracy |
Latvia | 48 | 7.05 | 49 | 7.05 | Flawed democracy |
Hungary | 49 | 7.04 | 43 | 7.21 | Flawed democracy |
Mexico | 50 | 6.93 | 50 | 6.93 | Flawed democracy |
Argentina | 51 | 6.84 | 51 | 6.84 | Flawed democracy |
Bulgaria | 52 | 6.78 | 52 | 6.84 | Flawed democracy |
Croatia | 53 | 6.73 | 53 | 6.81 | Flawed democracy |
Suriname | 54 | 6.65 | 54 | 6.65 | Flawed democracy |
Colombia | 55 | 6.63 | 57 | 6.55 | Flawed democracy |
Peru | 56 | 6.59 | 63 | 6.40 | Flawed democracy |
Sri Lanka | 57 | 6.58 | 55 | 6.64 | Flawed democracy |
Thailand | 58 | 6.55 | 58 | 6.55 | Flawed democracy |
Romania | 59 | 6.54 | 56 | 6.60 | Flawed democracy |
Indonesia | 60 | 6.53 | 60 | 6.53 | Flawed democracy |
El Salvador | 61 | 6.47 | 61 | 6.47 | Flawed democracy |
Paraguay | 62 | 6.40 | 62 | 6.40 | Flawed democracy |
Mali | 63 | 6.36 | 79 | 6.01 | Flawed democracy |
Serbia | 64 | 6.33 | 65 | 6.33 | Flawed democracy |
Lesotho | =64 | 6.33 | 77 | 6.02 | Flawed democracy |
Moldova | =64 | 6.33 | 66 | 6.33 | Flawed democracy |
Papua New Guinea | 67 | 6.32 | 59 | 6.54 | Flawed democracy |
Namibia | 68 | 6.24 | 69 | 6.23 | Flawed democracy |
Mongolia | 69 | 6.23 | 64 | 6.36 | Flawed democracy |
Dominican Republic | 70 | 6.20 | 70 | 6.20 | Flawed democracy |
Malaysia | 71 | 6.19 | 71 | 6.19 | Flawed democracy |
Zambia | =71 | 6.19 | 91 | 5.68 | Flawed democracy |
Macedonia | 73 | 6.16 | 73 | 6.16 | Flawed democracy |
Montenegro | 74 | 6.15 | 68 | 6.27 | Flawed democracy |
Philippines | 75 | 6.12 | 74 | 6.12 | Flawed democracy |
Benin | 76 | 6.06 | 72 | 6.17 | Flawed democracy |
Guyana | 77 | 6.05 | 75 | 6.05 | Flawed democracy |
Ghana | 78 | 6.02 | 78 | 6.02 | Flawed democracy |
Ukraine | 79 | 5.94 | 67 | 6.30 | Hybrid regime |
Hong Kong | 80 | 5.92 | 80 | 5.92 | Hybrid regime |
Singapore | 81 | 5.89 | 82 | 5.89 | Hybrid regime |
Guatemala | 82 | 5.88 | 76 | 6.05 | Hybrid regime |
Bangladesh | 83 | 5.86 | 83 | 5.87 | Hybrid regime |
Bolivia | 84 | 5.84 | 81 | 5.92 | Hybrid regime |
Honduras | =84 | 5.84 | 88 | 5.76 | Hybrid regime |
Malawi | =84 | 5.84 | 85 | 5.84 | Hybrid regime |
Albania | 87 | 5.81 | 84 | 5.86 | Hybrid regime |
Turkey | 88 | 5.73 | 89 | 5.73 | Hybrid regime |
Ecuador | 89 | 5.72 | 87 | 5.77 | Hybrid regime |
Tanzania | 90 | 5.64 | 92 | 5.64 | Hybrid regime |
Nicaragua | 91 | 5.56 | 90 | 5.73 | Hybrid regime |
Tunisia | 92 | 5.53 | 145 | 2.79 | Hybrid regime |
Senegal | 93 | 5.51 | 95 | 5.27 | Hybrid regime |
Lebanon | 94 | 5.32 | 86 | 5.82 | Hybrid regime |
Bosnia and Hercegovina | 95 | 5.24 | 94 | 5.32 | Hybrid regime |
Uganda | 96 | 5.13 | 98 | 5.05 | Hybrid regime |
Venezuela | 97 | 5.08 | 96 | 5.18 | Hybrid regime |
Liberia | 98 | 5.07 | 97 | 5.07 | Hybrid regime |
Palestine | 99 | 4.97 | 93 | 5.44 | Hybrid regime |
Mozambique | 100 | 4.90 | 99 | 4.90 | Hybrid regime |
Cambodia | 101 | 4.87 | 100 | 4.87 | Hybrid regime |
Georgia | 102 | 4.74 | 103 | 4.59 | Hybrid regime |
Kenya | 103 | 4.71 | 101 | 4.71 | Hybrid regime |
Bhutan | 104 | 4.57 | 102 | 4.68 | Hybrid regime |
Pakistan | 105 | 4.55 | 104 | 4.55 | Hybrid regime |
Sierra Leone | 106 | 4.51 | 105 | 4.51 | Hybrid regime |
Kyrgyz Republic | 107 | 4.34 | 106 | 4.31 | Hybrid regime |
Nepal | 108 | 4.24 | 108 | 4.24 | Hybrid regime |
Mauritania | 109 | 4.17 | 115 | 3.86 | Hybrid regime |
Niger | 110 | 4.16 | 128 | 3.38 | Hybrid regime |
Armenia | 111 | 4.09 | 109 | 4.09 | Hybrid regime |
Iraq | 112 | 4.03 | 112 | 4.00 | Hybrid regime |
Burundi | 113 | 4.01 | 110 | 4.01 | Hybrid regime |
Haiti | 114 | 4.00 | 111 | 4.00 | Hybrid regime |
Egypt | 115 | 3.95 | 138 | 3.07 | Authoritarian |
Madagascar | 116 | 3.93 | 113 | 3.94 | Authoritarian |
Russia | 117 | 3.92 | 107 | 4.26 | Authoritarian |
Jordan | 118 | 3.89 | 117 | 3.74 | Authoritarian |
Nigeria | 119 | 3.83 | 123 | 3.47 | Authoritarian |
Morocco | =119 | 3.83 | 116 | 3.79 | Authoritarian |
Ethiopia | 121 | 3.79 | 118 | 3.68 | Authoritarian |
Kuwait | 122 | 3.74 | 114 | 3.88 | Authoritarian |
Fiji | 123 | 3.67 | 119 | 3.62 | Authoritarian |
Burkina Faso | 124 | 3.59 | 120 | 3.59 | Authoritarian |
Libya | 125 | 3.55 | 158 | 1.94 | Authoritarian |
Cuba | 126 | 3.52 | 121 | 3.52 | Authoritarian |
Comoros | =126 | 3.52 | 127 | 3.41 | Authoritarian |
Gabon | 128 | 3.48 | 133 | 3.29 | Authoritarian |
Togo | 129 | 3.45 | 124 | 3.45 | Authoritarian |
Algeria | 130 | 3.44 | 125 | 3.44 | Authoritarian |
Cameroon | 131 | 3.41 | 126 | 3.41 | Authoritarian |
Gambia | 132 | 3.38 | 129 | 3.38 | Authoritarian |
Angola | 133 | 3.32 | 131 | 3.32 | Authoritarian |
Oman | 134 | 3.26 | 143 | 2.86 | Authoritarian |
Swaziland | =134 | 3.26 | 141 | 2.90 | Authoritarian |
Rwanda | 136 | 3.25 | 134 | 3.25 | Authoritarian |
Kazakhstan | 137 | 3.24 | 132 | 3.30 | Authoritarian |
Qatar | 138 | 3.18 | 137 | 3.09 | Authoritarian |
Belarus | 139 | 3.16 | 130 | 3.34 | Authoritarian |
Azerbaijan | 140 | 3.15 | 135 | 3.15 | Authoritarian |
China | 141 | 3.14 | 136 | 3.14 | Authoritarian |
Cote d’Ivoire | 142 | 3.08 | 139 | 3.02 | Authoritarian |
Vietnam | 143 | 2.96 | 140 | 2.94 | Authoritarian |
Bahrain | 144 | 2.92 | 122 | 3.49 | Authoritarian |
Congo (Brazzaville) | 145 | 2.89 | 142 | 2.89 | Authoritarian |
Guinea | 146 | 2.79 | 144 | 2.79 | Authoritarian |
Zimbabwe | 147 | 2.68 | 146 | 2.64 | Authoritarian |
Djibouti | =147 | 2.68 | 154 | 2.20 | Authoritarian |
United Arab Emirates | 149 | 2.58 | 148 | 2.52 | Authoritarian |
Yemen | 150 | 2.57 | 147 | 2.64 | Authoritarian |
Tajikistan | 151 | 2.51 | 149 | 2.51 | Authoritarian |
Afghanistan | 152 | 2.48 | 150 | 2.48 | Authoritarian |
Sudan | 153 | 2.38 | 151 | 2.42 | Authoritarian |
Eritrea | 154 | 2.34 | 152 | 2.31 | Authoritarian |
Democratic Republic of Congo | 155 | 2.15 | 155 | 2.15 | Authoritarian |
Laos | 156 | 2.10 | 156 | 2.10 | Authoritarian |
Guinea-Bissau | 157 | 1.99 | 157 | 1.99 | Authoritarian |
Syria | =157 | 1.99 | 153 | 2.31 | Authoritarian |
Iran | 159 | 1.98 | 159 | 1.94 | Authoritarian |
Central African Republic | 160 | 1.82 | 162 | 1.82 | Authoritarian |
Saudi Arabia | 161 | 1.77 | 161 | 1.84 | Authoritarian |
Equatorial Guinea | =161 | 1.77 | 160 | 1.84 | Authoritarian |
Myanmar | =161 | 1.77 | 163 | 1.77 | Authoritarian |
Uzbekistan | 164 | 1.74 | 164 | 1.74 | Authoritarian |
Turkmenistan | 165 | 1.72 | 165 | 1.72 | Authoritarian |
Chad | 166 | 1.62 | 166 | 1.52 | Authoritarian |
North Korea | 167 | 1.08 | 167 | 1.08 | Authoritarian |
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit. |
Methodology: Democracy Index
The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index is based on five categories: electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of government; political participation; and political culture. The overall index of democracy, on a 0 to 10 scale, is based on the ratings for 60 indicators grouped in the five categories. The overall index is the simple average of the five category indexes. A three-point scoring system for the 60 indicators is used. The category indexes are based on the sum of the indicator scores in the category, converted to a 0 to 10 scale. Countries are placed within one of four types of regimes: “full democracies” (scores of 8 to 10); “flawed democracies”—scores of 6 to 7.9; “hybrid regimes”—scores of 4 to 5.9; “authoritarian regimes”—scores below 4.