Middle East Monitor
Abderrahim Chalfaouat
Among the Arab Spring developments, Morocco has positioned itself as an exceptional political experience in the region. The monarchy, Islamist-led government and opposition parties and groups have generally agreed on the strategic narrative that sacrificing stability — via demanding regime change — risks not only overturning the political square but also changing the current geopolitical map completely.
As a result, Morocco has been portrayed as a flagship of a state initiating political change without giving up the benefits of socio-economic stability.
The 2011 constitutional amendments had led to the election of a new government, but local elections have been delayed several times. Instead of 2012, they are now taking place this month. One key reason for the delay is that political parties feared a large Justice and Development Party (PJD) win. Despite the demographic, geographical and political differences, opposition parties in particular deemed the PJD’s emphatic parliamentary win and increasing popularity to be a likely boost for another local and regional victory. Thus, they kept calling for the elections to be delayed, especially to prevent the polls from coinciding with major governmental reforms, such as creating a fund for supporting widows and orphans.
A second reason is that the extended regionalisation project lingered in the corridors of the specialised parliamentary committee. It finally saw light in May, after lengthy discussions and diverse amendments dealing mainly with the number of regions, the kind of powers to pass on to the regional councils, the way that the powers would be passed on, the educational level of the regional presidents and the regional councils’ transparency and accountability. All of these issues are pending while checks are made to see if regional limitations will persist.
Administratively, Morocco is divided today into twelve regions. For each region, a governing council is to be elected on 4 September. As a further step in a larger decentralisation approach to solve territorial disputes, regional councils are endowed with a number of powers to initiate economic, infrastructural, social and cultural reforms.
Yet, despite the paramount importance and great expectations of the regionalisation project, no benchmark has been set on each regional president’s educational level or number of mandates. This, though acknowledging the illiteracy levels in Morocco, allows experienced, often corrupt, candidates to lead whole regions for long periods. Regional presidents can be pushed to step down, if the given procedure is followed and the given administrative court takes the decision in due time.
In the coming elections, the main challenge is to extend and rectify the reforms that the government has carried out. Before the second version of the Islamist-led government, political discourse was based on highlighting the importance of stability for reform. Both majority and opposition politicians commonly used to claim that there would be no stability without reform, or no reform without stability, meaning that hampering reforms or failing to concretise them in fact jeopardised stability.
Today, stability is no longer a challenge, at least in political discourse. Thus, the whole focus in the forthcoming local and regional elections is shifting towards reform.
Reform is determined by a number of factors. The first is the wider context across the Middle East-North Africa (MENA) region. Characterised by regression, counter-revolutions and foreign intervention, different Islamist experiences have been forced to halt bloodily or to step back.
It is possible that the current elections were perceived as closure for the Arab Spring democratic outcomes. Up until the recent change in the Saudi leadership following the death of King Abdullah, Moroccan politicians generally feared that foreign pressure would lead Islamists to suffer the fate of the Ennahda Party in Tunisia, if not worse. That is why the UAE’s Dhahi Khalfan’s tweets against Moroccan Islamists received wide condemnation. Thus, Morocco needs to send a glimmer of hope for the rest of the Arab Spring countries that public advocacy can generate reform and improve socio-economic situations.
The presence of Islamists at the head of the government can also influence reform. Although it is true that the PJD has faced stiff opposition and harsh criticism of some of its decisions — and the Istiqlal Party withdrew from its first cabinet — the party has persevered towards finishing its five-year mandate. With local and regional elections, the PJD is expected to lead a number of city and regional councils. This will not only encourage political actors — including the monarchy — to accommodate their presence, but will also allow PJD candidates to gain more public trust for the party by localising and broadening the reforms and changes that the government has been implementing.
The third factor for reform is the quality of candidates. True, all PJD list heads are graduates, with 20 per cent of them holding PhDs. Yet,70 per cent of the 140,000 candidates are participating in elections for the first time, and many of them are illiterate or corrupt. With insufficient experience and inadequate education or transparency, meeting reform challenges requires more political awareness and managerial training, otherwise the same parties that promise reform will be its main obstacle.
The fourth factor is the forthcoming parliamentary election. Political discussions and expectations are looking at the 2015 local and regional elections as a public referendum on government reforms and a practice run for the 2016 parliamentary elections. Political parties compete for local government seats with eyes on parliamentary seats and national cabinet posts where key decisions are taken. It is not just government or opposition popularity which is under scrutiny, but also, and more importantly, the public will to support reform and participate in determining its pace.
In a nutshell, despite its decisive importance, the Moroccan socio-economic fabric may be rocked, not by the absence of stability, but the presence of unsteady political reforms, indications of regression and ongoing corruption. With political parties presenting unqualified candidates for local, regional and national elections, they risk instilling a sense of despair, strengthening counter-reform projects and increasing public opposition to the “reform within stability” narrative. For many parties, reform has to start from within.
