After an African-led intervention ousted al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) from northern Mali, fewer resources are available for extremist militants looking to wreak havoc in the Sahel.
Militants in Mali were either killed or dispersed, fleeing towards Algeria, Libya and Tunisia. AQIM now competes with offshoots, such as Mokhtar Belmokhtar’s “Signed in Blood Brigade“, for ransom, recruits and attention-grabbing headlines.
Most observers agree that the regional terrorist organisation that has caused major security unrest in North Africa over the last 10 years no longer has as much media momentum.
According to analyst Abu Bakr Othman, the Mali debacle greatly weakened co-ordination and communication between the radical elements. The recent operations in Algeria and Niger were not the result of careful co-ordination by terrorists, he says, but rather desperate attempts to show that they still existed.
Belmokhtar’s splinter group claimed credit for a Niger prison break in June, as well as for a twin bombing that left at least twenty Nigeriens dead last May.
Prior to the attacks in Niger, Mokhtar Belmokhtarorchestrated the siege at an Algerian natural gas plant near In Amenas, killing dozens of civilians.
It is unlikely, however, that such high-profile attacks will recur, “because the perpetrators exhausted their energy in those operations”, Othman says.
Other experts agree that the ability of Belmokhtar (aka Khaled Abou El Abbas or Laaouar) to carry out new attacks is waning.
The veteran militant, who has left a long trail of blood from Afghanistan to his native Algeria, lost strong support when he defected from AQIM months ago. He is also no longer capable of receiving ransom money after his attempt to trade funds in return for evacuating In Amenas failed.
That was a strong blow to a man accustomed to getting money from smugglers and some countries in return for releasing their hostages, analyst Amakenass Ag Akal says.
“Where will the group now get money to buy weapons and recruit supporters after he was confronted with force, which he was accustomed to using to get money?” he wonders.
Elhoussein Ould Gengine, a legal researcher, says that at first, he expected al-Qaeda activities to expand in the region in the wake of the Mali intervention.
“However, the war in Mali changed all balances. Al-Qaeda’s activities became weaker, the Malians have somewhat succeeded in calming things down, and they were able to hold the election in spite of the huge challenges,” the researcher tells Magharebia.
“In addition, the participation of some Azawadis in the election was almost a waiver of their support for al-Qaeda in Sahel and would weaken it in the sub-region. This also raises questions about whether al-Qaeda still has any sources of support,” Ould Gengine said.
Dr Ahmed Mouloud Ould Eyda, a history professor at the University of Nouakchott agrees that al-Qaeda was weakened by the war in Mali.
But, he cautions, it has not been eliminated once and for all.
“Its cells are scattered, and when circumstances permit, they will re-surface and re-arrange their ranks for the confrontation on a new or old front,” he says.
“I believe that the danger lies in extremist ideology, which wins new supporters every day, and this is a major threat for all of us,” Ould Eyda adds.
Yet even if al-Qaeda still has some sleeper cells, the professor says, the possibility they could strike is weak, because of a lack of financing and conflicts among wings.
“As to ransom money, it is undoubtedly one aspect of internal conflicts between the wings of group because it has been an important source of income,” he adds. “It’s known that security caution exercised by the Europeans and the war in Mali have drained this important financial source.”
As long as the extremist ideology remains, it will inevitably be used to influence the balance of power in the foreseeable future, says Dr Bakary Samba, director of the Observatory of Extremism and Religious Disputes at Gaston Berger University in Senegal.
“I can’t talk about actual force of al-Qaeda. But after it was hit, internal divisions took place,” Samba tells Magharebia. “I believe there are sleeping cells and that ideology has survived. Therefore, there should be caution because al-Qaeda always pays attention to the balance of powers to achieve its goals.”
“This is, then, a big paradox: while we talk about the elimination of al-Qaeda, we find movements by groups close to it in terms of ideology and we see politicians interacting with them,” he concludes. “This makes me conclude that although al-Qaeda is dead militarily, it’s still alive morally, and this also largely applies to Laaouar.”
Current data indicate that the decline in AQIM is not an exception among the global al-Qaeda network. The parent organisation in Afghanistan and the other branches have been dealt severe blows, weakening the morale of all other al-Qaeda affiliates.
After the death of Osama Bin Laden in Pakistan, Anwar al-Awlaki in Yemen and Abdelhamid Abou Zeid in Mali, last month it was the turn of Saudi Arabia’s Said al-Sehri, the second-in-command of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).
AQAP confirmed on July 17th that al-Sehri was killed in an airstrike in Yemen.
Mauritanian journalist Abdallah Ould al-Salek said that if al-Sehri were indeed killed, it would be the turn of the remaining AQIM leaders if the countries where they move, such as Niger, Mali or Libya, could ensure strong and large-scale co-ordination.
Jemal Oumar in Nouakchott contributed to this report for Magharebia
