Tuesday, November 5

Gaming Election Day, November 25th.

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September 7, 2011 @ 16:05 › Zouhair Baghough

For all the razzmatazz going on about the election, it is safe to say that little is likely to change when it comes to actual electoral campaigning. The truth is, the only political power with complete mastery of the demographics, gender and income distribution is, and remains, the MI (Ministry of the Interior) first because it is near impossible to get hold of precise data, and second, and unless it can be proven indeed, there is little incentive on behalf of MI officials to release it on public outlets (if not outright withholding intent) and how could a modern political party conduct a modern electoral campaign if even the basic data is lacking, or needs to be extracted from its reluctant source? Knowledge is power they say, and that holds particularly true for Morocco.

Fortunately, paper sources do make up for the shortfall in electronic references (and I really do wish that Open Data initiative championed by minister A.R.Chami was carried out to deliver some genuinely relevant information, instead of providing chicken pea…) and B.L. Garcia’s exhaustive surveyof Moroccan elections since 1960 does provide those tables necessary to paint a picture of the various constituencies and swing voters that have shaped -and most likely continue to this day- elections, whether local or general.

I had the opportunity earlier to point out that never in the history of Morocco, has one single party managed to secure absolute majority in one or both houses: 1963 was the closest thing to a majority coalition -and only by 49%, hardly a landslide and to the tune of an independent MP (Member of Parliament, not to be confused with FDICcomponent Mouvement Populaire) who joined in out of opportunism. Form then on, never did a party take full control of parliament (as we shall have the opportunity to observe later on) And so goes the prediction for the next election: there will be no PJDor PAM landslides; Front de Défense des Institutions Constitutionnelles (FDIC) coalition, failed to secure even absolute majority, only 69 seats out of 141 and 32.4% of votes, a result only topped by the independent surge in 1977. Constituencies were designed so as to favour FDIC candidates over Istiqlal-UNFP opposition, with the former allocated about 16,000 large constituencies per seat, while the latter had to compete for approximately 25,000 large ones. That explains the outrageous discrepancies between percentage of popular votes and allotted seats. Nonetheless, opposition parties had a strong showing, considering the awful electoral campaign and the aftermath of showdown over the constitution a couple of months earlier (December 1962)

An average of 16,414 votes per seat for FDIC, 24,353 for Istiqlal and 25,393 for UNFP. Hardly “free and fair elections”

The demographics tell their tales too: FDIC base constituency was at 85.7% made up of farmers (60.7%) and private-sector small employees (25%).Rémy Leveau coined the expression “The MoroccanFellah (farmer), defender of the throne” to refer to the exceptionally high, exceptionally stable and staunch turnout and vote in favour of ‘administrative’ parties (FDIC, RNI, PND, etc…) Of all parties, UNFP was the one with the most diverse constituency, a balanced sample across all professions; but because rural areas made up about half the total electoral corps, and because its share of rural voters did not go beyond 15%, UNFP could not perform better, certainly when compared to the stronger Istiqlal showing in the rural constituencies. Overall, candidates were expected to win with large margins in smaller, rural constituencies than when competing in urban ones. That explains why independents enjoyed an over-representation: rural voters in Tetuan, Fez and Casablanca made up half their of their larger, more rural constituencies than nationwide mean.

The geographical pattern vindicates the claim that rural areas are either coerced or bribed into voting for pro-regime candidates: out of the 18 administrative provinces (including Rabat and Casablanca districts) at the time, 4 were carried by FDIC with strong margins (including a 100% vote in Terfaya) in the North (Nador and Alhuceimas) the Eastern desert (Warzazate) and the rural regions of Hauz, Gharb and Chrarda – amalgamated in the Marrakesh and Casablanca provinces. Conversely, UNFP-Istiqlal opposition made a very strong showing by carrying cities -Casablanca and Rabat districts- as well as the Tangiers province. These have come out in favour of UNFP by an average of 46.3% of popular votes, while Istiqlal carried Meknes, Rabat and Oujda provinces with similar margins, and UNFP candidates also fared much better in Agadir with a 49% of popular votes.

The claim that key voters in Morocco are the rural population is vindicated by the first general elections, because their registration rate is higher than that of urban dwellers -even higher than national average- and their voting pattern is remarkably stable across time, even with fluctuating boundary changes; They remain a significant bloc of votes ‘dissident’ parties (UNFP, Istiqlal, or even PJD) have failed to control for many reasons that are to be discussed later on.

Mapping the 1963 Elections results shows the deadlock of regionalism, and explain why “winner takes all” landslide cannot prevail in Morocco (click for better resolution)

After King Hassan II has lifted the state of emergency in 1970 – with the promulgation of a new constitution the 1977 and 1984 elections rather confirmed what will become the trademark of any general election: local notabilities, whether in urban or semi-urban areas are swing voters and can deliver super-majorities (usually to pro-regime candidates) whenever needed: in 1977, USFP Premier Abderrahim Bouabid lost to Ahmed Ramzi, an independent candidate (who went on to be aHabus Minister in the Osman government) with a landslide 83.44% victory to the latter in Agadir district – a socialist stronghold at the time.

Though administrative interference had a lot to do with the systematic majorities independent or pro-regime party candidates had recorded during these elections, the critical variables to take into account is rather how well did local notabilities control constituents, and how they channelled these votes to support a candidate over another. This explains the independents’ landslide in 1977, and the momentum PND party (a rural breakaway from RNI in April 1981) gained in the 1980s. Both had a strong showing in rural constituencies: in 1977, the independents (later on, RNI representatives) carried constituencies such as Settat (6/7) Casablanca (7/20) Jedida (5/6) Taza (5/6) and Tiznit (all 4 seats) these constituencies are mainly rural. The same applies to MP party with its rural constituencies in Khemissat (2/4) and Nador (3/5).

1977 was also the election of Western Sahara constituencies, one seat each for Smara and Bojdor (Istiqlal carried both of them, but the Sahrawi representatives it had endorsed eventually defected in 1979 and joined Polisario) The Sahrawi constituency shared with the rural ones all the hallmarks of notabilities’ electioneering: the program matters very little, and only the candidate’s local connections, wealth and personal charisma -as well as personal loyalty to the regime- made a difference. On the other end of the constituency-types, educated voters and small employees in urban areas and large cities were prone to vote USFP or PPS more often than others. Although it has been pointed out that higher degrees-earners also tend not to vote; in short, USFP and PPS shared in 1977 and 1983, a population of educated people, with degrees varying from basic primary education certificate to high school diploma. College and University graduate, though general sympathetic to left-leaning themes, did not partake in voting during elections, as their successive turnouts tend to vindicate their apparent rejection of the whole electoral process.

The 1984 turnout has a peculiar property no other election before or after has featured: the discrepancy between cast vote ans effective popular vote. If one is to indulge into a joke, the Interior ministry felt so comfortable that even official figures do not account for, say, OADP candidates who managed to gather 70,637 votes, but were allocated only 32,766 votes instead. On the other hand, MPDC carried only 15,052 votes, but was credited with 69,862 instead. UC (20,407) MP (32,945) and PND (20,407) also benefited from a boost. USFP, on the other hand received its ‘fair’ share of votes. UC candidates won with landslide majorities in many regions, the Atlantic agricultural plains, the North all over the Rif mountains and land-locked constituencies in Khouribga. It is worth pointing out that particularly Essaouira, Tiznit, Skhirat and Salé had UC super-majorities with more than 50% of popular votes. RNI and MP parties also fared better, respectively carrying Tangiers, Tata and Sidi Kacem, as well as Ifrane, Khemissat and Warzazate. As such, and save for party switch from RNI to UC, there was little change over the larger rural constituencies who came out for the Triumvirate UC-MP-RNI, as they collected about 60.45% of seats, and 58% of popular votes.

1993 did not carry significant changes, indeed, Bernabé Garçia reports:

“It appears from the new political map that there are no significant changes since 1963, and the only new information it carries confirms the predictability of its outcome. Abstentia reached 37.25%, i.e. some 5 points above the recorded level in 1984. A high record of annulled ballots was also observed, some 930,000 votes, i.e. 8.16% of total electoral corps, and 13.01% of voters, compared to respectively 7.5% and 11.1% in 1984. While eligible voters amounted to 12,670,000 the electoral census registered only 11,398,997 voters, which means that about 1.25Million Moroccan were not registered, a figure 10% larger than those who had their ballots annulled. In short, one Moroccan out of two was prevented from voting, either by not registering or by destroying the vote they cast.

As for Koutla votes (Istiqlal-USFP 25.4% PPS 3.9% and OADP 3.1%) they amounted to 32.5% meaning that one voter out of three endorsed the change Koutla leaders have been calling for. These figures only show the lack of substantial changes compared to previous elections [In 1984, the Koutla carried some 31.1% of popular votes] B.L. Garçia – Translated in Arabic by B. Kharazi p.244-245 Ed. Difaf. 2009

The swing vote however was on specific constituencies, especially with landslide defeats UC incurred, but the margins remained, overall, unchanged

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